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Chapter 1
Immigrants in destination countries:
an introduction
1.1 Introduction
Recent data on international migration prove the importance of this phenomenon on the world
economy. According to the International Organization for Migration the estimated total number
of international migrants has increased over the last 10 years from 150 mil. in 2000 to about
214 mil. persons in 2010. The Department of Economic and Social A¤airs of the United
Nations estimated that in the last ten years the worldwide annual rate of change in the stock
of migrants was 1.8%. These facts, and the growing interest of national governments in setting
up new migration policies, suggest that the e¤ect of migration on destination countries will be
one on the burning points of the future world economy.
For a long time economic research focused on the labour market e¤ect of immigration
(Card 2001, 2005; Borjas 2003; Dustmann, Fabbri and Preston 2005; Aydemir and Borjas
2007) and the main conclusion of this stream of literature is that the e¤ect of immigration on
wages in destination countries is negative, even if very small. Only recently economic research
is focusing on other channels through which immigration may a¤ect destination countries
economic performances: (i) immigrants are supposed to have an e¤ect on per capita income,
physical capital accumulation and total factor productivity in destination countries (Ortega
and Peri 2009); (ii) immigrants may induce a shift in destination countriestechnologies toward
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labour intensive processes (Lewis 2005); (iii) the increased endowment of migrants in certain
regions may change the optimal international organization of production by rms (Ottaviano,
Peri and Wright 2010). Among all these possible e¤ects of immigration, this work focuses
on the e¤ect of immigration on income in destination countries and on the relation between
immigration and o¤shoring. In particular we will analyse the e¤ect of high skilled immigrants
on income in destination countries.
The skill content of migration, by changing the degree of substitutability with natives, is a
crucial point in determining the e¤ect of immigration on income in destination countries. This is
probably the reason why governments are recently looking at skill selective immigration policy
setting. Immigrants endowed with a high educational level are supposed to bring along them a
high human capital level allowing for a gain in income in destination countries, on the contrary
unskilled immigrants having a low human capital content induce a loss in per capita GDP in
destination countries (through the human capital dilution). The importance of the skill content
of immigrants has been recognized in theoretical literature on migration (Benhabib 1996), but
it has not yet been taken into account in empirical literature. In this work we want to account
for the skill level of immigration in determining its e¤ect on per capita GDP in destination
countries.
The second point that this work intends to analyse is the relation between immigration and
o¤shoring, in particular when employers in destination countries have not perfect information
on the ability of immigrants. Up to now, theoretical models on this stream of literature have
assumed perfect information about foreign born workers. The debate on the relation between
migration and o¤shoring is still open: some empirical works found complementarity between
migration and o¤shoring (Kugler and Rapoport 2005; Javorcik et. al 2006); in this view
immigrants in destination countries increase the information level on their origin countries,
stimulating outward foreign direct investment by domestic rms. On the other hand, some
studies found substitutability between immigration and o¤shoring (Barba Navaretti, Bertola
and Sembenelli 2008; Ottaviano, Peri and Wright 2010) providing evidence of the traditional
idea that immigration deters o¤shoring because it induces an increase in the return on capital
in destination countries (due to the reduction in capital labour ratio). In our view when a
migrant arrives in his destination country, he cannot bring along his informational structure,
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for this reason the link between migration and o¤shoring has to be analysed assuming imperfect
information about foreign born workers, and this is what we did in the fourth chapter of this
work.
1.2 Stylized facts on the settlement of migrants
In the spirit of this introductory chapter, before going in deeper in the literature on international
migration, we propose a short view of some stylized facts concerning the international movement
of labour to better understand the relevance of the phenomenon. Although in a globalized
economy, labour may appear as mobile as other production factors (such as physical capital),
it is important to notice that labour has been considered for long time less mobile that capital
for di¤erent reasons: (i) linguistic and cultural di¤erences between countries may discourage
labour ows; (ii) free ows of capital are supported by strong policy consensus (for its supposed
positive e¤ects on host economies) while labour is subjected to more political restriction and
to more or less explicit barriers. Nevertheless, data show the rapid increase in the worldwide
migration ows. The post industrial period of migration started in the 1960s, and from this
period on, the international migration ows had a constant increase up to the end of the 20th
century: between 1960 and 2005 the number of international migrants in the world more than
doubled, passing from an estimated 75 mil. in 1960 to 191 mil. in 20051.
In gure 1.1 you may notice the jump in net migration between 1980 and 1990, the stock
of worlds migrants passes from 99 mil. to 155 mil. of individuals, this is probably the e¤ect of
the disintegration of some countries: about 27 mil. of that increase was due to the reclassica-
tion of individuals moved inside USSR before the 1990 as internal migration and that became
international migrants after the USSR disintegration.
With respect to gure 1.2, the world stock of migrants as percentage of total population
in 1960 was about 2.5%, becoming just about 3% in 2005; by contrast, the same measure
for more developed countries passed from 3.5% in 1960 to almost 10% in 2005, proving the
1Notice that about a fth of this increase is the result of the transformation of internal migrants into interna-
tional migrants when some countries disintegrated (for instance USSR in 1991, Yugoslavia in 1992, Czechoslovakia
in 1993).
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Figure 1-1: Stock of international migrants at mid-year (both sexes)
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Figure 1-2: International migrants as a percentage of the population
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south-north peculiarity of migration in these years. An interesting feature of international mi-
gration concerns the pattern of the ows along years, as shown in gure 1.1, from 1980 the
pattern of international migration changes: the more developed countries surpassed the less
developed countries in terms of stock of migrants as a measure of the change in the migrants
ows direction. Analyzing the labour ows in/from Europe, since the 1970s European countries
traditionally considered as sending countries, like Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal, became
receiving countries (World Development Report 2009). Poor and middle-income countries now
send the highest share of the world migrants, among the top sending countries in 2000 there
were: Mexico, Afghanistan, Morocco, Algeria, Turkey, India and China. However Italy, United
Kingdom and Germany are still top sending countries (World Development Report 2009). The
pattern of the international migration is also changing from south-north to south-south. Even
if among the top-5 receiving countries there are United States, Germany and France, among the
top-20 destination countries (reported in gure 1.3) there are India, Pakistan, United Arab Emi-
rates, Hong Kong and China, Kazakhstan, Côte dIvoire and Jordan representing the changed
pattern in international migrantsows. United States of America and Russian Federation
remain the most two receiving country both in 1990 and 2005; among European countries, Ger-
many, France, Spain, United Kingdom and Italy in 2005 are in the top-20 ranking. Looking at
the historical data on international migrants stocks gure 1.4, Europe, Northern America and
Asia are the most migrants endowed continents but, in term of density of migrants Oceania has
the highest migrants-total population ratio (only in 2005 Northern America reaches a similar
quota), gure 1.5.
Focusing on Eu-15 countries, in gure 1.6 one may notice that Germany, France, United
Kingdom and Spain have the highest stock of international migrants in absolute value; while
in terms of migrants-total population ratio Luxembourg, Austria, Ireland and Sweden have the
highest ratios (respectively 37.4%, 15.1%, 14.1% and 12.4%). Finally we want briey provide
some very recent data on migration ows. Figure 1.7 shows the migrants population for six
geographic areas in 2010; as you may notice, North America and Oceania are still the most
immigrants endowed areas (in terms of share over total population); while in absolute values
the most immigrants endowed countries are United States, Russian Federation, Germany, Saudi
Arabia and Canada (gure 1.8). Up to now we showed the endowment of destination countries
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Figure 1-3: Top 20 countries or areas with the highest number of international migrants, 1990
and 2005
Rank Contry or Area Number ofmigrants (mil.)
As percentage





1 United States of America 23.3 15 United States of America 38.4 20.2
2 Russian Federation 11.5 7.4 Russian Federation 12.1 6.4
3 India 7.4 4.8 Germany 10.1 5.3
4 Ukraine 7.1 4.6 Ukraine 6.8 3.6
5 Pakistan 6.6 4.2 France 6.5 3.4
6 Germany 5.9 3.8 Saudi Arabia 6.4 3.3
7 France 5.9 3.8 Canada 6.1 3.2
8 Saudi arabia 4.7 3.1 India 5.7 3
9 Canada 4.3 2.8 United Kingdom 5.4 2.8
10 Australia 4 2.6 Spain 4.8 2.5
11 Iran 3.8 2.5 Australia 4.1 2.2
12 United Kingdom 3.8 2.4 Pakistan 3.3 1.7
13 Kazakhstan 3.6 2.3 United Arab Emirates 3.2 1.7
14 Hong Kong, SAR China 2.2 1.4 Hong Kong SAR China 3 1.6
15 Côte d'Ivoire 2 1.3 Israel 2.7 1.4
16 Uzbekistan 1.7 1.1 Italy 2.5 1.3
17 Argentina 1.6 1.1 Kazakhstan 2.5 1.3
18 Israel 1.6 1.1 Côte d'Ivoire 2.4 1.2
19 Kuwait 1.6 1 Jordan 2.2 1.2
20 Switzerland 1.4 0.9 Japan 2 1.1
1990 2005
Source : United Nations, Trends in Total Migrant Stock: the 2005 Revision.
Figure 1-4: Stock of international migrants at mid-year (both sexes)
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Figure 1-5: International migrants as a percentage of the population
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Figure 1-6: Presence of international migrants among EU15 countries
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Austria 0.10 0.13 0.17 0.22 0.28 0.28 0.47 0.72 0.93 1.23
Belgium 0.44 0.54 0.68 0.77 0.87 0.89 0.90 0.91 0.88 0.72
Denmark 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.19 0.22 0.25 0.30 0.39
Finland 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.10 0.13 0.16
France 3.51 4.45 5.21 5.57 5.89 5.96 5.91 6.09 6.28 6.47
Germany - - - - - - 5.94 9.09 9.80 10.14
Greece 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.12 0.17 0.31 0.41 0.55 0.73 0.97
Ireland 0.07 0.09 0.13 0.17 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.26 0.38 0.59
Italy 0.75 0.83 0.91 1.01 1.11 1.22 1.35 1.48 1.63 2.52
Luxembourg 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.14 0.16 0.17
Netherlands 0.45 0.34 0.26 0.34 0.49 0.76 1.19 1.39 1.56 1.64
Portugal 0.04 0.06 0.10 0.16 0.27 0.35 0.44 0.53 0.63 0.76
Spain 0.24 0.29 0.37 0.30 0.24 0.41 0.77 1.01 1.63 4.79
Sweden 0.29 0.39 0.54 0.57 0.61 0.65 0.78 0.91 0.99 1.12
United Kingdom 1.66 2.54 2.95 3.20 3.47 3.62 3.75 4.20 4.76 5.41
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Austria 1.5 1.8 2.3 2.9 3.7 3.7 6.1 8.9 11.4 15.1
Belgium 4.8 5.7 7 7.9 8.8 9 9 9 8.5 6.9
Denmark 1.8 2.1 2.4 2.7 3.2 3.7 4.3 4.8 5.7 7.2
Finland 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 1 1.2 2 2.6 3
France 7.7 9.1 10.3 10.6 10.9 10.8 10.4 10.5 10.6 10.7
Germany - - - - - - 7.5 11.1 11.9 12.3
Greece 0.6 0.8 1 1.4 1.8 3.1 4.1 5.1 6.7 8.8
Ireland 2.6 3.3 4.4 5.4 6.6 6.4 6.5 7.3 10.1 14.1
Italy 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 2 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 4.3
Luxembourg 13 15.8 18.2 21 25.5 28.3 30.2 33.4 36.9 37.4
Netherlands 3.9 2.8 2 2.5 3.5 5.3 8 9 9.8 10.1
Portugal 0.4 0.7 1.2 1.8 2.7 3.5 4.4 5.3 6.2 7.3
Spain 0.8 0.9 1.1 0.8 0.6 1.1 1.9 2.5 4 11.1
Sweden 3.9 5.1 6.7 7 7.3 7.8 9.1 10.3 11.2 12.4








Source : United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs
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Figure 1-7: Stock of migrants and its share over total areas population, 2010
Geographic area Migrants (milions) % of the Area's population
Europe 69.8 9.5
Asia 61.3 1.5
North America 50.0 14.2
Africa 19.3 1.9
Latin America 7.5 1.3
Oceania 6.0 16.8
Source : International Organization for Migration, regional and country figure.
in terms of immigrants, but in order to provide a clear picture of the immigrantssettlement in
receiving countries, we would supply some information about the concentration of immigrants
among regions in destination countries and on the skill content of immigrants.
1.2.1 High skilled immigrants endowment by destination countries
As better shown in the next chapters, a crucial point to assess the e¤ect of immigration in
receiving countries is the human capital content of them. So coherently with the descriptive
purpose of this chapter, we now briey describe the high skilled immigrants endowment by host
countries. By approximating the human capital content of immigrants using their education
attainment, in gure 1.9 we show the share of primary, secondary and tertiary educated over
total immigrants stock for 30 OECD countries. As you may notice Australia, Canada, New
Zealand, Ireland, United States of America are the main tertiary educated immigrants endowed
countries; while Austria, Czech Republic, Italy, Hungary have a very low tertiary educated
immigrantsstock. Considering the average share across countries for each education level, we
may conclude that OECD countries host mainly primary educated immigrants.
Immigration policy is one of the variables that may explain the di¤erences between countries
in terms of high skilled immigrants endowment. In facts, the main high skilled immigrants
endowed countries, like Australia, Canada, New Zealand and United States are those that early
set up selective immigration policies (gure 1.10 summarizes the immigration policies adopted
by some destination countries).
Recent trend in migration policy is toward the attraction of skilled migrants; for example
14












Source : International Organization for Migration, regional and
country figure.
in 2007 Czech Republic set the "Green Card" policy which points to attract tertiary educated
immigrants, similarly in 2007 Denmark attempted to attract high skilled workers with the policy
called "Danish a good place to work". Also the French policy is going into a high skill selective
policy, by promoting the program called "competencies and talent" which in facts separates the
list of immigration between high and low skilled migration. These new high skilled oriented
migration policies, with the old well consolidated selective policies by United States (H1-B visa),
Australia, Canada and New Zealand, conrm the trend by government in attracting high skilled
immigrants more than unskilled immigrants. In this direction moves also the recent tendency
by governments to add in traditional preferential trade agreements provisions regarding the
free movement of some high skilled professionals between countries (Horn, Mavroidis and Sapir
2009).
Thus, as happened for inward FDI, governments are trying to attract high skilled immi-
grants. But, is this interest supported by empirical evidence of the positive e¤ect of high skilled
immigrants on economic performances in destination countries? This is one of the motivations
underlying the third chapter of this work.
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Figure 1-9: Share of primary, secondary and tertiary educated over total immigrants stock in
1991 and 2001 in 30 OECD countries
Primary Secondary Tertiary Primary Secondary Tertiary
Australia 0.34 0.32 0.35 0.35 0.24 0.40
Austria 0.58 0.33 0.08 0.47 0.40 0.13
Belgium 0.69 0.18 0.13 0.62 0.18 0.20
Canada 0.38 0.12 0.51 0.30 0.12 0.59
Czech Republic 0.49 0.45 0.06 0.39 0.50 0.11
Denmark 0.56 0.30 0.14 0.45 0.38 0.17
Finland 0.64 0.20 0.16 0.49 0.28 0.24
France 0.84 0.06 0.10 0.75 0.09 0.16
Germany 0.68 0.15 0.17 0.66 0.12 0.22
Greece of birth 0.44 0.40 0.15 0.45 0.40 0.15
Hungary 0.74 0.18 0.08 0.68 0.20 0.12
Iceland 0.38 0.38 0.24 0.30 0.39 0.31
Ireland 0.22 0.51 0.27 0.14 0.45 0.41
Italy 0.53 0.32 0.15 0.53 0.32 0.15
Japan 0.43 0.35 0.23 0.34 0.38 0.28
Korea, Rep. Of (South) 0.26 0.41 0.33 0.19 0.43 0.38
Luxemburg 0.55 0.28 0.17 0.45 0.34 0.22
Mexico 0.50 0.16 0.34 0.35 0.21 0.45
Netherlands 0.63 0.20 0.17 0.50 0.28 0.22
Norway 0.29 0.46 0.25 0.22 0.49 0.29
New Zealand 0.36 0.21 0.44 0.33 0.26 0.41
Poland 0.67 0.21 0.12 0.61 0.25 0.14
Portugal 0.61 0.19 0.20 0.60 0.22 0.19
Slovakia 0.62 0.30 0.08 0.49 0.36 0.15
Spain 0.34 0.49 0.17 0.29 0.53 0.19
Sweden 0.44 0.38 0.18 0.34 0.40 0.26
Switzerland 0.51 0.34 0.15 0.55 0.26 0.19
Turkey 0.77 0.11 0.11 0.60 0.19 0.21
United Kingdom 0.56 0.24 0.20 0.34 0.31 0.35
United States of America 0.39 0.20 0.41 0.38 0.19 0.43
South Africa 0.66 0.18 0.16 0.54 0.24 0.22
1991 2001
Source : Docquier, Lowell and Marfouk (2007)
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Figure 1-10: Immigrants related policies among OECD countries
Country Maastricht Schengen Quota System Skill SelectivePolicy
Austria Y Y Y Y
Australia N N N.A Y
Belgium Y Y N N
Canada N N Y Y
Czech Republic Y Y N Y
Denmark Y Y N Y
Finland Y Y N N
France Y Y N.A Y
Germany Y Y N Y
Greece Y Y Y Y
Hungary Y Y N N
Ireland Y N N Y
Italy Y Y Y N
Japan N N N.A Y
Luxembourg Y Y N N
Netherlands Y Y N Y
New Zealand N N N.A Y
Norway N Y N N
Poland Y Y N N
Portugal Y Y Y Y
Slovak Republic Y Y N.A N
Spain Y Y Y N
Sweden N Y N N
Switzerland N Y Y Y
Turkey N N N.A N
United Kingdom Y N N Y
United States N N Y Y
Source : Author on Mayda(2008), Wanner and Dronkers (2005) and OECD International Migration Outlook 2010
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Figure 1-11: Map of the immigrants localization among European regions






Source: Author’s elaboration on Eurostat data.
1.3 Immigration, income and o¤shoring: descriptive evidence
Since the following chapters will focus on the relation between migration, income and o¤shoring
in destination countries; here we want to provide early descriptive evidence on how these three
variables combine themselves by using their geographical localization among European regions
(NUTS 2 level). Figure 1.11 shows the values of the immigrantsstock over total population in
2001; the map conrms what we observed in the former section on the high immigrants endowed
European countries (Germany, France, United Kingdom, Sweden, Switzerland, Luxembourg),
but it also emerges that immigrants tend to settle in regions with big cities (see the areas
around London, Madrid, Paris, Barcelona) conrming the idea that high population density is
associated with high immigration ows (De Arcangelis, Jayet and Ukrayinchuk 2010)
By comparing gures 1.11 and 1.12 (where per capita income in 2001 has been charted),
it emerges that immigrants in general tend to settle in high income countries. Obviously by
this simple description we cannot conclude anything about the causal relation of the positive
correlation between immigration and income in destination countries. Surely, it may be due to
the fact that high income regions assure the highest probability to nd a job for a new migrant;
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Figure 1-12: Map of per capita GDP in European regions
Source: Author’s elaboration on Eurostat data.






moreover high income regions are those with a high existing stock of migrants so that network
e¤ect in migration works in attracting new immigrants. The fact that immigrants tend to settle
in high income countries (or regions) implies the endogeneity problem in estimating the e¤ect
of immigration on income in destination countries (see paragraph 3.3).
The second point that we are going to focus on the rest of the thesis is the relation between
migration and o¤shoring. One important stylised fact is that the location of factor movements
is highly correlated. Figures 1.13 and 1.14 show the regional concentration of both inward and
outward FDI among European countries. By making a comparison with immigrants localization
in gure 1.11, it is particularly striking the strong and very signicant correlation between
migration and outward FDI (fairly good overlap between the high migration and the high
o¤shoring regions). This is particularly true for some regions in Spain, France, UK, Italy,
Sweden and Norway. On the other hand, it seems that there is not a good correlation between
migration and inward FDI (this is clear by looking at Eastern Europe regions). This early
evidence, by showing a kind of relation between immigrants and o¤shoring activities by rms,
well motivates what we are going to do in the last chapter of the thesis.
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Figure 1-13: Map of the outward FDI projects among European regions






Source: Author’s elaboration on OCOMONITOR data.
Figure 1-14: Map of the inward FDI projects among European regions






Source: Author’s elaboration on OCOMONITOR data.
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1.4 Plan of the thesis
Starting from the consolidated literature on the labour market e¤ects of immigration (summa-
rized in the second chapter in what follows) the aims of this work are: (i) to assess the impact
of skilled immigration on income in destination countries (chapter 3) and (ii) to understand the
relation between immigration and o¤shoring when asymmetric information about foreing born
workers is assumed (chapter 4). So, the rest of the thesis is composed follows:
Chapter 2, "The economic impact of migration on host countries: a survey", provides
a survey of the literature on the e¤ects of migration on the economic performances in host
countries. The aim of the chapter is to provide a synthetic view of both theoretical and empirical
literature to better understand how host economies are a¤ected by changes in their foreign born
population endowment. The chapter is intended to clear the ground for the following chapters.
Chapter 3, "Skilled migration and economic performances: evidence from OECD coun-
tries", investigates the e¤ects of immigration ows and their human capital content on per
capita GDP variation in 24 OECD host countries. Theoretical models conclude that the ef-
fect of immigrants in host countrys income depends on the human capital content of migrants
(Benhabib 1996); empirically the question is still open and this paper contributes to make light
on this. So we propose an empirical estimation of the e¤ects of immigrants and their human
capital content on per capita GDP variation. Using an IV model to solve the endogeneity
problem we found that high human capital content by immigrants has a positive e¤ect on per
capita GDP variation, but it is not enough to fully compensate the overall negative e¤ects of
migration on changes in per capita output.
Chapter 4, "O¤shoring, migrants and natives workers: the optimal choice under asym-
metric information", presents a theoretical model about the optimal choice for a rm between
o¤shoring and hiring immigrant workers under asymmetric information about their ability and
e¤ort in production (symmetric information is assumed about home born workers). When a
domestic rm hires an immigrant it doesnt know his ability; while when the rm goes abroad it
uses local agent in order to buy additional information about workers, thus enforceable contracts
may be set. We show that it is optimal for rms to produce low quality products o¤shoring the
production abroad, while intermediate quality level products will be produced at home using
foreign born workers. Finally, high quality products will be produced using native workers.
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Chapter 2
The economic impact of migration
on host countries: a survey
2.1 Introduction
International ows of migrants are having an increasing role in the world economy: the total
number of international migrants has increased over the last 10 years from an estimated 150
mil. in 2000 to 214 mil. persons in 2010;1 in other words, today one of out of every 33 persons
in the world is a migrant. These facts represent, in our view, both the importance of the
topic and the main motivation for this chapter, which focuses on the e¤ects of immigration
on host countrieseconomic performances. The topic became a burning issue in the popular
debate some years ago, when immigration appeared to have a negative e¤ect on home born
workers employment; moreover, the recent trend in immigration policies by countries, and the
contemporaneous increase in o¤shoring activity by rms in developed countries, increased the
research interest in investigating the economic e¤ect of immigration and its relation with rms
o¤shoring decision.
Immigration has an e¤ect on a lot of economic related aspects in both receiving and sending
countries; but in this chapter we will focus only on its e¤ect on host countries. In literature
have been studied the e¤ects of immigration on prices, employment, wages, physical and human
1United Nationstrend in total Migrants Stock: the 2008 revision; http://esa.un.org/migration
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capital accumulation, productivity, economic growth, o¤shoring decision by rms, etc; among
them, in this chapter, we decided to have a survey of the existing literature on: (i) the e¤ect of
immigration on labour market, because of its importance in literature and because it is a crucial
point for understanding all the other possible e¤ects on immigration in receiving countries; (ii)
the e¤ect of immigration and its human capital content on income in destination countries,
because of its policy implication in terms of skill selective migration policies; (iii) the relation
between immigration and rmso¤shoring decision in host countries, because of it is a burning
point in the recent literature.
Traditionally, economists considered the labour market as the main channel through which
immigration a¤ects the host economy: immigrants increase the unskilled labour supply decreas-
ing its price. Although the former proposition may appear a hard fact, unambiguous empirical
evidence has not been found. Some studies, such as Aydemir and Borjas (2007), Card (2001;
2005) nd negative (even if weak) e¤ect of immigration on home-born workers wage, while Otta-
viano and Peri (2008) and Peri and Sparber (2009) nd a positive e¤ect of immigration on local
labour market. This ambiguity seems to be due to two main arguments that we will analyse
in what follows: (i) immigrants and home-born individuals may be more or less substitute; (ii)
empirical approaches present some problems to solve.
But the labour market is not the only channel through which immigration a¤ects the host
country, there is also a literature that looks directly at the e¤ects of immigration on income level
and growth in host countries. Dolado, Goria and Ichino (1994) set a growth model in which
immigration contributes both to increase the population growth and to modify the human
capital accumulation equation. They recognize the importance of the skill level of immigrants
in determining their e¤ect on income and growth in receiving countries, empirically they nd
an overall negative e¤ect of immigration on both growth and income. On the other hand,
Ortega and Peri (2009) by using the so called "accounting approach" nd a positive e¤ect of
immigration on real GDP growth rate. The fact that has not been reached a consensus in
literature on the e¤ect of immigration on income, and its relevant role in immigration policy
setting, pushed us to have a survey of this literature. The last stream of literature we are
going to present in this chapter is about the relation between immigration and o¤shoring in
immigrants receiving countries. This is a very recent literature and there are some ambiguous
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empirical results: some works found a strong substitutability between immigrantsows and
outward FDI by host countries (Barba Navaretti, Bertola and Sembenelli 2008; Olney 2009a),
some others found a kind of complementarity between the two phenomena (Javorcik et.al. 2006;
Kugler and Rapoport 2005). We nd useful to have a survey of this literature because, although
it is very recent, it is growing very quickly.
The chapter is structured as follows: second paragraph summarizes the e¤ects of immigra-
tion on economic performances in host countries, by looking in particular at the e¤ect on labour
market (paragraph 2.2.1) and on income (paragraph 2.2.2). In paragraph 3 we summarize the
ourishing stream of literature on immigration and o¤shoring. The last paragraph concludes.
2.2 The economic e¤ects of immigration on host countries
Stylized facts shown in the former chapter prove the importance of understanding the economic
e¤ect of immigration on host countries.
The e¤ects of immigration on host countries have been theoretically tackled by several points
of view and the conclusions strictly depend on the assumptions made in developing the model.
As we will see in what follows the e¤ect on the host countries theoretically depends on whether
foreign and home born workers are assumed as perfect or imperfect substitutes and on whether
immigrants are assumed to bring along them some human capital or not. By the empirical
point of view, economists focused a lot on the labour market e¤ect of immigration, considering
the e¤ect of immigration in receiving countries passing only through the labour market, but it is
just one outcome of interest (Hanson 2008). This is the reason why there are several empirical
works on the e¤ect of immigration on labour market (Grossman 1982; Card 2005, 2001; Borjas
1995, 1999; Ottaviano and Peri 2006; DAmuri, Ottaviano and Peri 2010). Most of them nd
a small, even if negative, e¤ect on the home born workerswage. But few empirical papers
have been written on the general e¤ect of migration on income and its variation in destination
countries2.
Given both the importance of the literature on the labour market e¤ect of immigration and
2Other stream of research focused on the e¤ect of immigrants both on the host countrys demand side and
on the e¤ects on the public expenditure.
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its crucial role in understanding all other possible e¤ects of immigration on receiving countries,
we propose in what follows a brief survey of literature on the labour market e¤ect of immigration,
stressing the key point of whether immigrants are substitute or complements with natives in
understanding their e¤ects on employment and wages. In this section we also provide a survey
of literature on the e¤ect of immigration on income in receiving countries, focusing both on the
nature of the studies (growth model or accounting approach) and on the skill composition of
migrants in determining their e¤ect on per capita GDP. The need for organizing this stream of
literature originates from the lack in surveys literature on this particular e¤ect of immigration
(to our knowledge); but it is also useful to clear the ground for the next chapter.
2.2.1 The e¤ects of immigration on local labour market
A lot of empirical and theoretical works have been written on the e¤ect of immigration on local
labour market (Grossman 1982; Card 2001, 2005; Borjas 1995, 1999; Ottaviano and Peri 2006;
DAmuri Ottaviano and Peri 2010); most of them concern the e¤ect of immigration on US
labour market (typically on micro data) and the main result of these works is that the impact
of immigration on national wage is negative, rarely positive, but always small. The starting
point for analyzing the debate on the e¤ect of immigration on the host country is the Ryczynski
theorem (1955): when a country (or region) is open to trade with other countries, exogenous
change in labour supply (immigration) increases the output of product which employs labour
relatively more intensively and decreases the output of the other good; this leaves relative
factor prices unchanged. For this reason recent (mainly empirical) papers nd modest degree
of competition between immigrants and less skilled natives, namely immigrants a¤ects only
marginally the labour market of natives in USA (Altonji and Card 1991). Also Card (2001)
concludes that immigrations e¤ect on US labour markets is very small, moreover he nds that
this is valid both for all workers and for the bottom of the skill distribution. Other works on
other countries conrm this kind of evidence (De New and Zimmermann 1994; Pischke and
Velling 1997; Winter-Ebmer and Zweimüller 1999). But this is just a part of the problem,
because immigrants may be imperfect substitutes for natives.
Peri and Sparber (2009) set a model in which unskilled immigrated individuals do not com-
pete with unskilled home born individuals, they have comparative advantage in di¤erent tasks
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and thus unskilled immigration leads to a change in the productive specialization (increasing
the overall labour productivity). In particular there will be a shift in the specialization of the
host country: it will specialize in the task provided by immigrants, and wages for this kind
of task will relatively decrease. In this setting immigration may inuence the host economy
performance increasing the labour productivity by task specialization. Peri and Sparber (2009)
also provide empirical evidence of the fact that immigration changes the task specialization
in the host country. Hanson (2008) set up a model where unskilled immigrants and unskilled
home born individuals are mostly substitute, thus migration leads to the equalization of labour
price: initially migration is not allowed and rich countrys wages are higher than wages in poor
country, when migration is allowed, unskilled workers will ow from poor to rich country and
the wage in receiving country will decrease. Thus, the theoretical prediction about the e¤ect of
low skilled workers immigration depends upon: (i) whether the host country is open or closed
to international trade, and (ii) the degree of substitutability between native and immigrants.
In a closed economy, immigration will lower the price of factors with which migrants are
perfect substitutes and it will raise the price of factors with which they are complements.
Assuming that in the host economy there are capital and both unskilled and skilled workers;
if an unskilled ow of immigration occurs, the wage of this factor of production will decrease,
and the e¤ects on the other two factors are ambiguous. The fall in the unskilled wage will
induce employers to substitute away from capital and skilled labour to unskilled workers; but
the unskilled workers inow means also that the optimal output is now greater; this scale e¤ect
will induce employers to use more of all inputs. This is what happens in a closed economy with
no di¤erences in native and foreign-born unskilled workers. If native and foreign workers are not
substitutes, they work as di¤erent factors of production and native unskilled workers wage wont
be a¤ected by immigration ows. In an open economy (such as the traditional Heckscher and
Ohlin models) trade is driven by di¤erence in factor endowments and factor price equalization
occurs. In this framework, immigration will lead to an increase in unskilled-labour intensive
production (change in host country specialization) but wages will remain unchanged. This
occurs because immigration leads the host country to export more low skilled intensive good.
Obviously, when factor price equalization occurs, there is no reason for international migration.
Immigration occurs if and only if a wage di¤erential exists; but a wage di¤erential exists if and
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only if trade is not free (as in Mundell 1957) or when there are some wage rigidities. Otherwise
a wage di¤erential can be maintained by restrictions to international labour ows.
Since in the real world the assumption of closed economy is less plausible, the key question
that allows us to discriminate between positive and negative e¤ect of immigration on home-born
workers wages is: are immigrants and home-born individuals substitutes or complements? To
see how the assumption of substitutability/complementarity between immigrants and natives
a¤ects the prediction of theoretical models, we report results of Borjas (2009) who analyses the
e¤ect of immigration on domestic wages under the two possible assumptions on the relation
between immigrants and natives. Author set a model in which only two goods are produced
(one domestically and the other is imported), consumers have a quasy-linear production function
and physical capital and labour contribute to the production of the domestic good following a
CES production function. Initially foreign-born workers and natives are considered as perfect
substitutes, and immigrants are shown to have a detrimental e¤ect on national wage both in the
short and in the long run3. The next step in Borjas (2009) is to assume heterogeneity of workers
in production (high and low skill workers) and imperfect substitutability between immigrants
and natives workers (in doing this he uses a nested CES function). Author shows that by
considering heterogeneity of workers in term of their skill composition, the e¤ect of immigration
on wage is detrimental for the skill group with the higher supply shock due to immigration.
This conclusion suggests the importance of the skill composition of immigrants in understanding
the e¤ect of immigration on the economic performance of receiving countries (this is a crucial
point for the next chapter). Finally, when imperfect substitutability between immigrants and
natives is considered, a positive e¤ect is added to the overall change in wage level due to
immigration shock: assuming that an immigration inow doubles the pre-existing immigrants
workforce, and that immigrants in the skill group i make a 10% of the total workforce; using
the native-immigrants elasticity of substitution estimated by Ottaviano and Peri (2008) equal
to 20, the native wages increase by 0.5%, while using an elasticity equal to 5.5 (as in Ottaviano
and Peri 2006) the natives wage increases by 1.8%. This is basically what the theory of factor
demand says, but as we will see in the next section, empirical literature found di¤erent e¤ects
3 In the short run physical capital does not adjust to immigration shock and an increase in the return on
capital is expected. In the long run physical capital adjusts to the immigrants shock, the return on capital comes
back to its initial value and the e¤ect of immigrants on wage is mitigated with respect the short run case.
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of immigration on wages. The following paragraphs will show some empirical and theoretical
literature on this topic, dividing studies nding complementarity between immigrant and native
workers from those nding sustitutability.
Home-born and foreign born workers as imperfect substitute
As we argued in the former section, from a theoretical perspective, if we assume perfect sub-
stitutability between migrants and native workers we should expect a negative e¤ect of immi-
gration on domestic real wage, but if we assume imperfect substitutability a positive e¤ect is
allowed. This ambiguity reects in empirical research; indeed despite a huge number of pa-
pers on the e¤ect of immigration on local labour market have been written, literature has not
reached any kind of consensus. There exist two main streams on this topic: (i) authors who
nd negative relation between immigration and low-skilled home born workers and thus perfect
substitutability among them (such as Borjas 2003; Borjas, Grogger and Hanson 2008; Aydemir
and Borjas 2007); (ii) authors who nd positive relation between immigration and low-skilled
home born workers and thus imperfect substitutability (such as Ottaviano and Peri 2006, 2008;
Peri and Sparber 2009; and DAmuri, Ottaviano and Peri 2010). This paragraph contains
a survey of works that found imperfect substitutability between immigrants and home-born
unskilled workers.
DAmuri, Ottaviano and Peri (2010) using data for Germany found perfect substitutability
between old and new immigrants but imperfect substitutability between immigrants and home
born workers, this is coherent with the idea that immigrants and home born individuals do not
compete for the same kind of occupation (tasks). The underlying idea is that immigrants and
home born individuals have comparative advantage in di¤erent tasks (Peri and Sparber 2009).
Firstly authors estimate the e¤ects of new immigrants (1992 has been chosen as watershed
between old and new immigrants) on the old immigrants employment, they found that when
equivalent education is used to stratify workers, 10 new immigrants in German labour market
cause the loss of 2 old immigrants jobs. They also estimate the e¤ect of new immigrants on
the native employment, and they nd positive and robust e¤ect of immigration: new immi-
grant workers in Germany dont crowd out native employment. Moreover, authors nd strong
evidence of imperfect substitutability between new immigrants and native workers. Finally,
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DAmuri, Ottaviano and Peri (2010) estimate the e¤ect of immigration on native wages, they
nd that assuming imperfect substitutability between immigrants and native workers (elasticity
of substitution equal to 16) immigration increase the nativeswage; while by assuming perfect
substitutability immigration reduces a bit (closely to zero) the nativeswage.
Peri and Sparber (2009) show theoretically that immigration leads to an increase in the
relative wage of home born individuals, by assuming that foreign and home born individuals
have comparative advantages in di¤erent tasks. Immigration shifts the initial specialization to
the task where immigrants have a comparative advantage. From the empirical point of view,
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where &D is the average native-born supply of one kind of task (manual) and D is the
average native-born labour supply of a second task (communication). Using di¤erent sample of
data, authors nd robust evidence of the positive relation between foreign born workers share
on the CD=MD ratio, so immigration increases the natives specialization in communication
tasks (this conrms the assumed imperfect substitutability between native and foreign born
workers). Coe¢ cient associated to C is positive and signicant, while coe¢ cient associated
to M is negative and signicant. In particular a 1% increase in foreign born labour share
brings to a 0.31% increase in nativessupply of communication tasks and to a 0.03% decrease
in nativessupply of manual tasks. To solve the endogeneity problem authors use a traditional
instrument in this literature, observing that new immigrants tend to move in the same region
(or urban area) in which previous immigrants live, and that a large proportion of immigrants in
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USA from 1960 and 2000 came from Mexico, the location preferences of Mexicans was used as
an instrument. It is time and region variant and it is uncorrelated with the changes in demand.
Estimations with this instrument (using IV technique) give the same results as OLS: immigrants
lead to a shift in native labour supply (from manual tasks to communication tasks), and to an
increase in the nativessupply of communication task and to a reduction in the nativessupply
of manual tasks.
Ottaviano and Peri (2008) answer to the critique by Borjas, Grogger and Hanson (2008)
by re-estimating the elasticity of substitution between immigrants and native workers in pro-
duction. They nd robust evidence of the imperfect substitutability between immigrants and
natives by using: (i) di¤erent sample of data (all people who worked for wages except self-
employment and the former sample without people enrolled in school), (ii) di¤erent specica-
tion sample (men, women, overall) and (iii) di¤erent combination of xed e¤ects (education
by experience, years, year by experience, year by education). In all these cases the estimated
elasticity of substitution between natives and migrants is about ve (imm ' 5):
Other empirical estimations assessing a kind of complementarity between foreign and native
workers are: Gavosto, Venturini and Villosio (1999) for Italy, Haisken-De New and Zimmerman
(1999) for Germany, Dolado, Jimeno and Duce (1996) for Spain, Winter-Ebner and Zweimuller
(1996) for Austria and by Carrigton and De Lima (1996) for Portugal.
Home-born and foreign born workers as substitutes
When natives and foreign born workers are assumed as perfect substitutes a detrimental e¤ect
of immigration on wages is expected. The assumption of perfect substitutability may be done
under two circumstances: (i) one good with two kinds of labour (skilled and unskilled) , (ii)
two goods and two kinds of labour.
Lets assume a one good production and two types of labour framework (skilled and un-
skilled), immigration increases only one skill group (for example unskilled one) which will su¤er
a wage reduction both in short and long run. But the other skill group will benet from an
increased wage. Finally, imagine a traditional Heckscher and Ohlin framework with two goods
and two types of labour. Immigration increases the endowment of one skill group, for example
unskilled one, this will reduce the wage of unskilled worker relative to skilled one in the short
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run. Now the unskilled intensive industry becomes more protable, it expands its output, and
accordingly to the Rybczynski theorem, wages of the unskilled group increase relative to the
skilled one. But in the long run wages are unchanged and the output mix shift towards the
unskilled intensive industry.
The rst work who found perfect substitutability between foreign born and native was
by Grossman (1982). The author estimated the elasticity of substitution among factors, by
assuming a production function where inputs are native workers, second generation immigrants
workers, foreign born workers and the capital stock. He found that both second generation and
foreign born workers are substitutes for native workers, while capital is complement with the
all kind of labour (but the degree of complementarity is strongest with foreign born workers).
Grossman (1982) argues that the e¤ects of immigration have to be analyzed with respect to the
time horizon: in the long run wages are exible to adjust, while in the short run natives a wage
rigidity occurs. In the short run, when natives wages are downwardly inexible, a 10% increase
in immigrants leads to a 0.8% decrease in native employment (rms switch away from natives)
and to a decrease in immigrants wages by 2.2% but the return on capital increase by 0.2%
attracting capital. In the long run when all wages are exible, a 10% increase in immigrants
leads to a 1% decrease in natives wage, to a 2.3% decrease in foreign born wages and to a 4.2%
increase in return on capital. Altonji and Card (2001) found ambiguous results on the e¤ect
of immigrants on natives employment and wages. Using cross section analysis on 120 major
SMSAs for the 1970 and 1980 Census, they found negative, even if small, e¤ect of immigrants on
the employment/population ratio among unskilled natives. But a positive e¤ect of immigrants
was found on the weekly wages: a 10% increase in immigrants leads to a 4.7% increase in weekly
earnings. The rst di¤erences estimation shows di¤erent a result: immigration increases the
native employment/population ratio (e¤ect on wages isnt signicant).
Card (2001) studied the e¤ect of immigration on labour market outcomes, the main point of
this work is the denition of an instrumental variable (widely used today in literature) in order
to solve the endogeneity problem in new immigrantslocalization4. Card (2001) nds that in
4The basic idea is that new immigrants go where earlier immigrants waves are localized (network ethnic





the short run an inow of immigrants in the period 1985-1990 reduced the relative employment
rates of natives and low-skilled service occupation by up to 1% and by up to 3% in immigrants
intensive cities. Moreover, immigration reduced the relative wages of workers and less-skilled
service workers in high immigrants cities by no more than 3%.
More recently Borjas, Grogger and Hanson (2008) starting from the paper by Ottaviano e
Peri (2006) concludes that data do not allow the rejection of the hypothesis that equally skilled
immigrants and natives in the United States are perfect substitutes. They tackle Ottaviano
and Peri (2006) by two points of view: (i) by showing the sensitivity of the Ottaviano and Peri
(2006) results to various methods of addressing the within-cell heterogeneity problem, (ii) by
proposing alternative estimates of the elasticity of substitution after the corrections in the data
set used by Ottaviano and Peri (2006). Borjas, Grogger and Hanson (2008) by replicating the
estimates by Ottaviano and Peri (2006) nd the weak robustness of the estimates of imm but
the sign and the average value are similar to those in Ottaviano and Peri (2006). Authors also
correct5 the data set used by Ottaviano and Peri (2006) to nd new estimates for imm; after
these corrections they provide evidence of negative elasticity of substitution between immigrants
and native workers reassessing the substitutability between foreign and home born workers.
Figure 2.1 summarizes the empirical evidence on the kind of substitutability that has been
found in literature up to now.
2.2.2 The e¤ects of immigration on host countries economic performances
The debate on immigration policies usually turns around a question: is immigration bad for
the host countrys economic performances? The previous paragraph reported some evidences
on the e¤ect of immigration on the local labour market, but a new stream of literature is
growing in recent years (Ortega 2008; Ortega and Peri 2009; Bellini, Ottaviano, Pinelli and
Prarolo 2009), it concerns the e¤ects of immigration on economic performances in destination
where Mg is the number of immigrants from an origin country g entered in US between 1985 and 1990; gc
is the fraction of immigrants from an earlier wave of immigration from country g living in city c; gj represents
the fraction of immigrants from g employed in occupation j. So SP is the estimated immigrants ows in absence
of demand pull factors, for this reasons it is well correlated with the gross immigration inows and uncorrelated
with economic or labor market performance.
5Two main corrections concern: 1. the consistency of immigration status along the time horizon, 2.the
restriction of the sample by excluding self-employed workers.
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on native's wage Country
Aydemir and Borjas (2007) perfect negative Canada
Altonij and Card (1991) perfect ambiguous USA
Angrist and Kugler (2002) perfect - EU
Borjas (2003) perfect negative USA
Borjas, Grogger and Hanson (2008) perfect negative USA
Borjas Freeman an Katz (1996) ambiguous ambiguous USA
Card (2001) perfect negative USA
Card (2005) perfect negative USA
Carrington and De Lima (1996) imperfect negative Portugal*
D'Amuri, Ottaviano and Peri (2010) imperfect positive Germany
De New and Zimmerman (1994) perfect negative Germany
Dustman, Fabbri, Preston and Wadsworth (2003) imperfect positive UK
Gavosto, Venturini and Vollosio (1999) imperfect positive Italy
Grossman (1982) perfect negative USA
Hunt (1992) perfect negative France*
Ottaviano Peri (2008) imperfect positive USA
Peri Sparber (2009) imperfect positive USA
Pischke and Velling (1997) imperfect - Germany
Pope and Wither (1993) imperfect no effect Astralia
Velling (1995) perfect no effect Germany
Winkelmann and Zimmerman (1993) perfect negative Germany
* This paper focused on the effect of repatriates
Source : Author
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countries. Per capita GDP has been widely used as a proxy for economic performance of
receiving countries. The importance of this topic is straightforward if one looks at the policy
implication, nevertheless few empirical works has been written in solving this question. There
are two main reasons for this lack in literature: (i) endogeneity problem (a detailed treatment
in what follows); (ii) data problem. Recently data on migration become more reliable, so
empirical works are now feasible (the endogeneity problem can be solved by using instrumental
variable estimation). From a theoretical viewpoint, the economic e¤ect of migration on receiving
countries can be analyzed by using two di¤erent approaches: (i) traditional growth models
and (ii) the accounting approach. Traditional growth models insert (both theoretically and
empirically) immigration in well consolidated growth model to show the e¤ect of immigrants
ows into per capita GDP growth rate variation in receiving countries (Barro and Sala-I-Martin
1992; Dolado, Goria and Ichino 1994). The idea is that, starting from the extension of the
traditional Slow-Swan model, and assuming immigrants endowed with zero human capital,
immigration is like an increase in countrys population so that immigration leads to a slower
economic growth in per capita terms (because of the local capital dilution). But by assuming
immigrants transporting some kind of human capital (Benhabib 1996), the dilution of local
physical capital may be o¤set and some economic growth in per capita terms is allowed. The
accounting approach consists of estimating the e¤ect of immigration on per capita GDP by
looking at the e¤ect of immigration on each component of the per capita GDP function (Ortega
and Peri 2009); this literature uses mainly static panel data model or a cross section approach
(this stream of literature is having new lymph in recent years). Thus the two former approaches
to the relation between immigration and per capita GDP are the main objects of this section;
but before going in deep on their description, we need to briey focus on two propaedeutic
points to this literature: (i) the "immigration surplus" and (ii) some empirical problems arising
when immigration is involved in estimating equations.
A rst step toward the relation between immigration and income: the immigrants
surplus
The rst step in understanding the potential e¤ect of immigration on host countries is to provide
an explanation of the so called "immigration surplus" as the overall receiving country gain from
36
immigration. In doing this we follow two papers: Borjas (1995) and Hanson (2008). Given a
traditional production function with capital (K) and labour (L), the labour force is divided in
home-born and foreign-born individuals. Initially let us ignore the possibility that immigrants
might augment the host countrys capital stock, and immigrants (M) and native (N) workers
are perfect substitutes in production (so, L = N +M). Moreover the model assumes labour
supply curve being inelastic. At the equilibrium the remunerations of production factors (w
and r) are equal to their marginal production, and national income (GDP) is: Q = rK + wN .
Without migration, the national income is simply given by w(0)BN in gure 2.2, but
when immigration is allowed, the national labour endowment rises as far as L and the new
internal equilibrium shifts to the point L   W (1). As a result the national wage decreases,
but the national income increases (if and only if the increase in workers is larger than the
wages decrease). The di¤erence with respect the initial equilibrium is the trapezoid BCNL.
Since the rectangle DCNL is the immigrantsincome, the so called immigrantssurplus is the
triangle BCD (as usual the increased area under the labour demand curve and wage level).
The immigrantssurplus assumes the following form:
[2.4] immigrants surplus = [w(0) w(1)]M2 =  12sem2
Where s is labours share of national income, e is the elasticity of factor price for labour,
m is the fraction of the workforce that is foreign born. The elasticity of factor price is small
when the labour demand is elastic, so we can conclude that the immigration surplus is small
when labour and capital are easily substitutable. The elasticity of factor price is large when
labour demand curve is inelastic. The immigration surplus, therefore, arises because of the
complementarities that exist between immigrants and native-owned capital.
Hanson (2008) shows the welfare consequences of immigration allowing for di¤erent skill
levels in the workforce (low-skilled and high skilled) and for simplicity (as in Borjas 1995)
labour supply curve is inelastic. He also assumes that there are two countries in the model:
one migrants sending country and one receiving country. Using the same graphical instrument
as in Borjas (1995) we can analyze the e¤ect of migration in sending and receiving country as
in gure 2.3; where the horizontal axis is the total amount of unskilled labour (L) in the two
economies (home, h and foreign, f). At the initial equilibrium (point 1 in gure 2.3), Lh1 low-
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skilled persons work in receiving country, while L Lh1 individuals work in the sending country.
So, there exists a wage di¤erential between sending and receiving country. When low-skilled
workers are allowed to freely move between countries, there will be migration from low wage
country to high wage country as far as the wage will equalize (point 2 in gure 2.3). In the
receiving country home-born workers lose income-area A, while the gain in income for native
high-skilled workers is given by A+B. The immigration surplus in the receiving country is the
B area and it coincides with the gain in terms of GNP, while the gain in terms of GDP is the
B+C+D+E area (because it includes the income that migrants receive in receiving country). In
the sending country native high-skill workers have an income loss equal to D+F, not migrating
workers gain the area F and migrating native low-skilled workers have an income gain equal to
area C+D. The sending country gains in GNP by C and loses in GDP by D+E. World national
income increases by B+C as migration eliminates di¤erences in labour productivity between
countries. In order to have a Pareto gain from international migration, home low-skilled workers
have to receive an income transfer by A and sending countrys high-skilled have to receive an
income transfer by D+F. These transfers may derive from redistributive taxes.
From the description of the immigration surplus, we can conclude that receiving country
gain in terms of GDP by hosting immigrant and that worlds welfare is increased by south-
north migration because of the clearing of labour productivities between sending and receiving
countries. But notice that we cannot conclude anything by the point of view of per capita GDP
in destination countries, to this purpose we refer to the following paragraphs.
Econometric problems
A second reason, other than theoretical assumptions, of why such ambiguity in empirical evi-
dence about the e¤ects of immigration is concerning empirical methods and strategies. A lot
of approaches have been used in this literature, this is due to some problems that arise when
one tries to estimate immigrations e¤ect on host country: (i) endogeneity from immigrants lo-
calization choice, (ii) composition e¤ect, (iii) internal migration and factor price equalization,
(iv) measurement errors. In order to solve the former problems, a lot of devices have been used:
(i) using di¤erences in cross-sectional analysis, (ii) using time series, (iii) separating labour
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market outcome on the basis of the origin of labour, (iv) using internal migration ows, (v) us-
ing instrumental variable (both for endogeneity problem and measurement errors). Endogeneity
arises if immigrants choose where to stay on the basis of higher regional wage or GDP, in this
case it is not only that immigration drives economic performances (or labour market changes),
but local economic performances drive immigration. This problem leads to a biased estima-
tion. In order to solve this problem one can use data from two or more periods (the so called
di¤erences in cross-sectional analysis), the change in immigrants density will not be a¤ected by
the change in the local wage, and any correlation between those changes will be attributable
to the e¤ect of a change in immigrants density on the change in wages (Friedberg and Hunt
1995). On other way to remove endogeneity is to use instrumental variables: if one can nd
a variable correlated with the change in immigrants presence and uncorrelated with the local
economic performance, the bias due to immigration choice can be removed. When immigrants
choose the region where to stay, they can take into account also other aspects of a region,
such as existing networks and the presence of community with the same culture and language.
Thus, besides economic performance reasons, immigrants may tend to settle in regions with
high density of immigrants or population in general (De Arcangelis, Jayet and Ukrayinchuk
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2010). Since the stock of existing immigrants in a region is unlikely to be correlated with cur-
rent economic shocks (notice that a su¢ cient time lag is necessary), historic settlement pattern
may solve the endogeneity problem. Altonji and Card (2001) used the stock of immigrants in
1970 as an instrumental variable for the change in immigrants population between 19701980
in USA cities, the logic is the following: new immigrants tend to go where other immigrants
already exist, but this variable is uncorrelated with local economy outcome or wages. They
nd that immigrants have a negative e¤ect on participation rate and on the weekly earnings.
A 1% increase in immigration reduces by 1.2% unskilled home-born wages. Pischke and Velling
(1997) apply the same method as in Altonji and Card (1991) to German data for 1985 and
1989, and they nd a weak detrimental e¤ect of immigration on local wages.
An estimation technique which avoids any problem of endogeneity is the time series ap-
proach, in this way any bias due to localization choice may arise. Pope and Withers (1993)
used this approach for Australia, nding no immigrations negative e¤ect on local labour mar-
ket.
Composition e¤ect is due to the impossibility of discriminate between wage earned by im-
migrants in the region and wage earned by home-born workers in the same region (Friedberg
and Hunt 1995). Thus, if immigrants earn less than native, regions with a higher presence of
immigrants have a lower average wage even if immigrants have no e¤ect on local labour market.
This problem can be solved using individual-level census data with which one can control for
many individuals characteristics (see LaLonde and Topel 1991).
Since regions are open economies, inter-regional migration ows are allowed and so the
problem of internal migration and factor price equalization may arise: if factor price equalization
occurs the regional e¤ect of immigration can be removed although it exists at national level.
Blanchard and Katz (1992) for USA and Decressin and Fatas (1995) for Europe, suggest that
it is reasonable to seek the impact of immigration by using cross-sectional data at regional
level, since the bias due to the factor price equalization toward zero (because it takes a lot of
time to achieve). The problem of internal migration can be removed by instrumental variables
(or obviously by controlling for the internal migration ows). In summary, one can assume
that factor price equalization is not so rapid as to nullify cross-sectional analysis; however,
it is important to use instrumental variables to solve the compensation problem of internal
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migration.
An other approach to estimate the labour market e¤ects of immigration is the so called
wage inequality literature; this kind of studies use both cross sectional and time series analysis.
The idea is to calculate the contribution of immigration to local unskilled labour supply and
then the e¤ect of the changed unskilled labour supply on their wages. Borjas, Freeman and
Katz (1992) use time series data for USA from 1967-1987 and nd that immigration implies
25% of the total 10% decline in the relative earnings of high school dropouts; in this period
the immigration rose from 6.9% to 9.3%, so, 1% increase in immigration leads to 1.2% decrease
in absolute wage of dropouts6. Borjas and Ramey (1995) used a cross sectional analysis, they
found that a 1% increase in the fraction foreign-born reduces the wage of high school dropouts
relative to college graduates by 0.6%. This kind of estimates overstates immigration e¤ects
because they su¤er the composition problem: the results confound the immigration negative
impact with the algebraicnegative e¤ect (the increased number of immigrants reduces the
mean wage, because of the low wage earned by immigrants). In general, the wage inequality
literature can be thought as an upper bound on the negative e¤ect of immigration on wages.
Measurement errors in immigrants density plays a central role in studies on the e¤ects of
immigration in destinaiton countries; to the extent that it has been often recognized as the main
motivation of the weak or null e¤ect of immigration on labour market in destination countries
(Aydemir and Borjas 2010). Measurement errors problem implies inconsistent and biased7 OLS
coe¢ cient, but it may be solved by using IV estimation. The consequence of the bias in OLS
estimation due to measurement error is amplied in small sample studies and often implies OLS
coe¢ cient being lower (in abosolute value) than IV coe¢ cient: the OLS estimate is determined
by the partial correlation between labour market measure and immigrants share, while the
IV estimate is determined by the partial correlation between labour market measure and the
component of the immigrants share explained by our instruments. Thus, mechanically, the fact
that the OLS estimate is usually smaller than the IV estimate means that labour market partial
association with the component of immigrants share that is not correlated with the instrument
6This result is coherent with ndings in Altonji and Card (1991).
7The bias is expected to be toward zero if measurement error involves only one right hand side variable. If the
measurement error involves more than one explanatory variable, we cannot say ex ante that the bias is toward
zero.
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is weaker than its partial association with the component that is correlated (attenuation bias).
This problem reduces using large sample of data such as national census (Dustman et al. 2003).
The solution for the measurement error is to use instrumental variable, for example one can
use other alternative measures of immigration from other surveys as instrumental variables of
the regional immigrants density.
The main message of this paragraph is that when immigrants related variable is used as a
determinant for certain economic performances, a lot of caution has to be paid in choosing the
right (less biased) estimation method.
Migration in the growth literature
The rst attempt to analyse the e¤ect of immigration ows on per capita GDP in host countries
was to consider immigration ows as a further source for population growth in both theoretical
and empirical growth model. These early models inserted immigration in the basic Solow-Swan
model framework, by assuming immigrants endowed with zero human or physical capital. Given
this assumption immigration has the e¤ect of reducing per capita income because of the local
physical capital dilution. This point is evident by looking at the baseline Solow-Swan model in
terms of prediction of investment rate (s) and population growth (n) on real per capita income






= lnA(0) + gt+ 1  ln(s)  1  ln(n+ g + )
where as usual Y (t)L(t) is the per capita output in a certain time period t; A is the level of
technology, g is the growth rate of technology,  is the physical capital depreciation rate and
 is the contribution of physical capital to the total output. Thus, assuming immigration as a
simple exogenous increase in population (by increasing n), it has a negative impact on per capita
GDP (Mankiw, Romer and Weil 1992). Similarly emerges the negative impact of immigration
on per capita GDP growth under the former assumptions on technology and immigration.
Notice that these models assume immigrants as perfect substitute for natives in production.
Afterwards immigrants have been assumed as capital endowed workers, so potentially they are
allowed to contribute to the human capital accumulation process in the augmented Solow-Swan
model framework (Mankiw, Romer and Weil 1992); where human capital also contributes to
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the production process. Thus if immigrants are assumed to bring a certain quantity of human
capital along them, human capital dilution may be o¤set. It is simple to see the point by






= lnA(0) + gt+ 1   ln(sk) +

1   ln(sh)  1  ln(n+ g + )
where all symbols have the same meaning that in equation [2.5] but sk in now the fraction
of income invested in physical capital and sh the fraction invested in human capital;  is the
human capital share of output (Mankiw, Romer and Weil 1992). By looking at equation [2.6]
immigration a¤ects both the population growth side and the human capital accumulation side
of [2.6]. Following this view, the crucial point is to understand how big is the threshold level
of human capital endowment of immigrants in order to be growth enhancing (i.e. to o¤set
the human capital dilution due to an simple increase in population). If immigrants own a
low quantity of human capital, their impact is similar to a simple faster population growth in
slowing per capita GDP (and growth). If immigrantshuman capital is higher than natives,
growth will be speeded up (Benhabib 1996; Friedberg and Hunt 1995).8
This is what emerges from the paper by Dolado, Goria and Ichino (1994), which modies
the Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) model by considering immigration as a source for working
population growth rate and as a source of human capital accumulation.9 In this paper authors
consider a three factors production function (labour, physical and human capital) characterized
by constant return to scale. Immigration enters into the model by modifying the population
growth equation (by adding the net immigration rate), and the human capital accumulation
equation by splitting the human capital sources into natives and immigrants led. They conclude
that zero human capital endowed immigration has negative e¤ect on output and growth in host
country, while a higher human capital level owned by immigrants has a positive e¤ect on both
output in level and income growth rate.10 In particular the overall e¤ect of immigration on
growth would be positive if the average human capital content of immigrants is higher than
that owned by natives.
8See Friedberg (2000) for more details on the portability of human capital by immigrants
9 In this model immigrants do not contribute to physical capital accumulation
10This conclusion holds in the more realistic case in which immigrants own less aggregate human capital than
natives
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Similarly, in a very recent paper Azarnert (2010) set a model in which he distinguishes two
di¤erent possible e¤ects of high skilled immigration mass inows. He found that high skilled
immigration is growth enhancing for the destination countries, if their human capital content
is enough to overweigh the immigration-induced adverse e¤ect on educational incentives for
natives.
So we may conclude from a theoretical perspective that, by modifying traditional growth
model and assuming perfect substitutability between native and foreign born immigrants, the
e¤ect of immigration depends on the kind of immigrants: if immigrants own a low quantity of
human capital they negatively a¤ect both output in level and GDP growth; but the higher is
their human capital content, the higher is their contribution on output and GDP growth.
Although theoretical models have been reached unambiguous conclusion about the relation
between immigration and growth and about the role played by the human capital content by
immigrants, only few empirical studies have been conducted and not a clear picture emerges
from these. A very seminal paper on the e¤ect of immigration on per capita income growth was
by Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1992); authors regressed per capita income growth on the level of
per capita income in 47 Prefectures in Japan and 48 States of the U.S. In this case coe¢ cient
associated to income level represents convergence between regions; by adding immigration vari-
able to the estimated equation the convergence coe¢ cient rises, moreover they obtain a positive
coe¢ cient for the immigration variable: a 1 percent point higher immigration is associated to
0.1 percent higher growth rate. When authors use instrumental variable estimation to solve
the endogeneity problem, the coe¢ cient becomes not signicant and the convergence coe¢ cient
remains unchanged with respect the estimation without immigration. So they conclude that
immigration has a little e¤ect on income growth. Dolado, Goria and Ichino (1994) built a data
set of 23 OECD countries from 1960 to 1985 and estimated a traditional empirical growth model
by including the net immigrants inows rate as a component of the total population growth
rate, and the human capital content by immigrants as an additional source of the human capital
accumulation process. They found a negative and signicant e¤ect of immigration on per capita
income growth, concluding that the reason of such negative impact of immigration relies on the
fact that immigrants in OECD countries own lower human capital than natives. Kim, Levine
and Lotti (2010) after a simulation exercise conclude that migration of no-skill bias and skilled
45
migration (from low to high TFP regions) is in general benecial for both the receiving country
and the world growth rate by respectively 3% and 5%. But purely unskilled immigration has a
negative impact on the world growth rate (-3.5%). But having a purely unskilled immigration
is not likely since has been shown that immigration is always biased toward skilled workers.
A new approach to the relation between immigration and income: the "accounting
approach"
The accounting approach consists of calculating the logarithm derivative of per capita GDP
(after having specied the production function) and then analysing the e¤ect of immigration on
each component of the log total derivative of per capita GDP. For example, assuming a simple









where as usual, y is the log of per capita GDP, A is the log of the total factor productivity, K
is the log of physical capital and L is the log of the labour force employed in production. The idea
is to see the e¤ect of immigration on each component of equation [2.7]. For example immigration
may a¤ect TFP by increasing the e¢ ciency of production process given its complementarity
with native workers (Peri and Sparber 2009); on the other hand immigration may a¤ect the
physical capital accumulation because, in the short run, immigration by decreasing the capital-
labour ratio may increase the return on capital in destination countries.
This is the approach used in the paper by Ortega and Peri (2009), which has also the
merit to nd a new way to solve the immigrantslocalization endogeneity problem by using the
estimated bilateral immigration ows. Thus they use a 2SLS estimation to analyse the e¤ect of
immigration on each component of the per capita GDP function. In particular they show that
an increasing immigration leads to: (i) an increasing employment growth, (ii) an increasing
physical capital growth and (iii) a null e¤ect on TFP growth. Moreover they estimate the e¤ect
of immigration on per real GDP growth nding that a 1% increase in immigrants ows entails
about a 1% increase in the real GDP growth rate. But the e¤ect of immigration on per hour
worked GDP growth is null. Ortega (2008) uses the population growth due to immigration as
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an independent variable for per capita GDP and per hour worked GDP growth. He nds that
a 10% increase in population growth (induced by immigrants) leads to a 6.7% increase in GDP,
but to a reduction of 3.3% in per capita GDP growth and to a reduction of 4% in per hour
worked GDP growth.
Felbermayr, Hiller and Sala (2010) use a cross section analysis to determine the sign of the
relation between immigrants stock and per capita GDP in destination countries. They also
control for institutional quality, trade and nancial openness, nding that immigrants stock
boosts per capita GDP in destination countries. In particular a 1% increase in the migrants
stock leads to a 0.22% increase in per capita GDP (in level). Similarly Bellini, Ottaviano,
Pinelli and Prarolo (2009) nd that the share of foreigners over total population in destination
countries has a positive e¤ect on per capita GDP among EU destination regions. Sparber
(2010) uses data on 48 US states from 1980-200 to explore the relationship between cultural
diversity and per capita GDP variation. In this paper the racial diversity has been approximated
using the fractionalization index (the complement to one of the sum over races of the squared
immigrants share in each state and time period). Instrumental variable estimation shows
a positive and signicant e¤ect of diversity on per capita GDP by controlling for 8 economic
regions11, but using all the 48 state xed e¤ects to account for time invariant income explanatory
variable (other that diversity), coe¢ cient on diversity becomes insignicant. In the spirit of the
accounting approach, Sparber (2010) also estimate the e¤ect of racial diversity on TFP, nding
again a positive and signicant relation controlling for the eight regions xed e¤ects, and a null
e¤ect when controlling for all the 48 US states.
The empirical evidence on the relation between immigration and income (following the
accounting approach)12 do not take into account an important feature arising from theoretical
growth models: the human capital content of immigrants. It seems that, although theoretical
models highlight the importance of the human capital content of immigrants in determining
their e¤ect on per capita GDP (in both levels and growth), empirical papers did not take into
account this dimension. This is one of the motivations of what we will do in chapter three.
11New England, Middle Atlantic Coast, Great Lakes, Plains, Southeast, Southwest, Rocky Mountains, Fae
West.
12The other common characteristic of the all empirical papers following the accounting approach is that static
xed e¤ects panel data model have been used
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2.3 Relation between immigration and o¤shoring: a ourishing
stream of literature
The aim of this section is to provide a survey of literature on the relation between migration and
o¤shoring. From a theoretical point of view this link has been studied rstly by Ramaswami
(1968) and by Bhagwati and Srinisavan (1983) who criticised the paper by Ramaswami (1968)
because it relied on the assumption that the wages of immigrants in destination countries are
lower than those earned by natives. Recently some empirical papers conrmed the idea that
immigrants earn a lower wage than natives13, giving in this way new lymph to the debate on
the relation between immigration and o¤shoring. The central issue in the literature concerning
immigration and FDI, is to understand if immigrant employment substitutes or pushes foreign
direct investment. The importance of this relation lies in policy implications: it would be
important for policy makers to know this relation in order to set global optimal rules on factor
mobility. Indeed, if immigration is used by rms to reduce costs and to be internationally
competitive, policy makers would relax quotas on immigration, also if it would reduce outward
FDI.
The relation between immigration and o¤shoring is ambiguous both from a theoretical point
of view and from the empirical results. In a traditional Heckscher Ohlin (H-O) framework
capital will ow to where it is less relatively abundant (so where its remuneration is higher), at
the same way labour will ow to where it is relatively more paid. So under the H-O approach,
immigration and FDI are substitutes: immigration leads to a reduction in capital labour ratio
and to an increase in the home return on capital, this will deter outward FDI (o¤shoring) and
will attract inward FDI. Conversely more recent models use a di¤erent approach: immigration
(both skilled and unskilled) increases the home rmsinformation about the foreign countries
(business networks); this reduces the foreign country risk and will induce home rms to o¤shore
production abroad (by this viewpoint a kind of complementarity exists between immigration
and o¤shoring). The paper by Kugler and Rapoport (2005) goes in this direction showing a
positive relation between immigrants stock in US and o¤shoring activity by US forms. In order
to put things simple, three kinds of relations may occur:
13Antecol, Cobb-Clark and Trejo (2003); Butcher and Di Nardo (2002); Chiswick, Le and Miller (2008).
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 the rst e¤ect of immigration is to reduce the number of workers in the foreign country,
but it leads to a reduction of the capital labour ratio in home country and thus to an
increase in the home return on capital, that deters o¤shoring by home rms and attracts
inward FDI. By this point of view outward FDI and migration are substitutes, while
inward FDI and immigration seem to be complements. But this viewpoint omits the skill
composition of migration.
 a more unskilled immigration increases the proportion of unskilled in the home population
and the proportion of skilled in the origin country, so it also relatively increases the
capacity of the foreign economy to adopt new technologies (in other words it increase the
e¢ ciency of workers) and it will stimulate FDI outow by home rms; thus immigration
and outward FDI seem now complement (El Yaman, Kugler, Rapoport 2007)
 a third link between FDI and migration exists, skilled migrants usually take part in
business network and unskilled migrants convey information on the characteristics of their
native country, these aspects contribute to reduce the country risk and increase outward
FDI ows.
2.3.1 Theoretical literatute on migration and o¤shoring
The complementarity between outsourcing and immigration was pointed out for the rst time by
Ramaswami (1968). The question that Ramaswami (1968) posed concerns the choice between
two strategies for a developed country able either to send some of its capital abroad (FDI) or
invite some foreign labour to work in the home country (assuming it could be obtained at a
lower wage rate). Author shows that when national income is maximized, import of the scarce
factor (labour) is preferable to export the abundant factor (capital), this is possible only if
home country is able to attract foreign workers without disturbing factor prices abroad (Jones
and Coelho 1985). In Jones (2005) outsourcing and immigration are both used by the rm to
reduce the marginal cost of production, but since outsourcing is costly it will be optimal to
use immigrants work for a little scale of production and outsourcing (or o¤shoring) when the
scale is large. Bandyopadhyay and Wall (2007) set a model with one good, two factors and
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two countries (home, foreign). Factors of production are physical capital and skilled workers,
but home rms can use home skilled workers, immigrated skilled workforce and foreign resident
skilled workforce (by means of o¤shoring). Here authors show that an increase in immigration
brings to a decrease in outsourcing, so immigration and outsourcing seem to be substitutable.
In a recent paper Olney (2009b) set a model where immigration is incorporated in a trade
in task framework; he assumes a two factors of production technology, low skilled and high
skilled workers performing a continuum of tasks. Each task requires a certain amount of both
low and high skilled labour. He also assumes that o¤shoring of high skilled tasks and the
immigration of high skilled workers are negligible (and this is probably the weak point of the
model, in particular with respect to those countries that, by selective immigration policy, host
high skilled immigrants more than low skilled ones). In this model o¤shoring and immigration
combine in determining their e¤ects on national wage, in particular: (i) o¤shoring has a more
positive e¤ect on the wages of low-skilled workers than immigration; (ii) the impact of o¤shoring
and immigration on wages becomes more similar as the workersskill level increases.
In the theoretical section of the paper by Ottaviano, Peri and Wright (2010), it is proposed
a model in which the nal output is produced by using high skill and low skill intermediates in
a Cobb-Douglas production function; while each intermediate input is produced by assembling
horizontally di¤erentiated tasks. In particular each low skilled task can be either realized at
home by using native or immigrants workers or o¤shored in a foreign country (enjoying a lower
wage). Since the three alternatives are perfectly substitutable, for each task the rm decides
the optimal strategy minimizing the cost of production of the single task. The two crucial
assumptions in the model are that the cost of taskso¤shoring is increasing in tasksdi¢ culty,
and that the productivity of immigrants employed by rms at home is decreasing in tasks
di¢ culty. Deriving the marginal cost for each strategy, authors conclude that it would be
optimal for the rm: (i) to o¤shore the easiest tasks abroad, (ii) realize very di¢ cult task at
home using natives and (iii) produce intermediate tasks (in di¢ culty) at home by employing
immigrants workers.
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2.3.2 Empirical literature on migration and o¤shoring
Empirical evidence is not unambiguous in solving the theoretical debate. Kugler and Rapoport
(2005) nd evidence of contemporaneous substitutability and dynamic complementarity be-
tween migration and FDI. Authors focus in particular on the importance of the skill compo-
sition of migrants: a more skilled emigration decreases the average level of human capital in
migrantssending countries and this deters the inows on FDI (because the reduction in human
capital reduces the capacity of the economy to adopt new technologies).
Kugler and Rapoport (2005) estimated the following equation





where Ki;t is the change in capital stock in country i nanced by FDI from the United
States between 1990 and 2000, X 0i;t 1 is a set of control variables,M
0
i;t 1is the stock of migrants
coming from country i in the United States by educational attainment in 1990, whileM 0i;t is the
rate of change in the components by educational grade completed US immigrants between 1990
and 2000. Results show that unskilled emigration from country i to United States stimulates
the ows of FDI from US to the country i, conrming the idea that immigrants in US by
increasing information about their origin countries, boost outows of FDI from US to origin
countries. Replicating the same estimation for only FDI in the service sector, authors nd
contemporaneous substitutability (2 < 0) and dynamic complementarity (1 > 0) between
skilled emigration from country i to US and the FDI outows fro the US.
Javorcik et al. (2006) concludes that migrants in US and FDI outward are positive cor-
related, in particular for highly-educated migrants. Estimating an equation in which the de-
pendent variable is the stock of US FDI in a certain country i (as the value of total assets of
non-bank a¢ liates of non-bank Us parents), they nd a strong evidence of the positive e¤ect of
both total and tertiary educated US stock of immigrants coming from country i on the stock
of US FDI. More precisely a one percent increase in the total stock of immigrants in US form
country i implies a 3% increase in the stock of US FDI in country i. Again the skill level of
immigrants matters in determining the relation between FDI and migration: a 1% increase in
the stock of tertiary educated immigrants in US is associated with a 4% increase in the stock
of US FDI. Docquier and Lodigiani (2007) with data for 114 countries from 1990 to 2000 nd
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that the elasticity of FDI growth rate to skilled migration is about 2%. Buch, Kleinart and
Toubal (2006) using bilateral data for Germany for the period 1991-2002 nd a positive relation
between the stock of inward FDI and the stock of immigrants coming both from the same coun-
try and from other countries (but the coe¢ cient associated to the stock of immigrant from the
same country is close to zero). This suggests some agglomeration e¤ect among foreign factors
from di¤erent countries. This agglomeration e¤ect concerns only high-income countries, this is
due to a positive coe¢ cient associated to an interaction variable as per capita GDP (of source
country) and the stock of immigrants from the same country.
Barba Navaretti, Bertola and Sembenelli (2008) by using data on 4289 manufacturing Italian
rms in the period 2001-2003 found a negative relation between o¤shoring and the share of
foreign born workers (over total rms employees); more interestingly they also put the rms
skill workforce composition as the share of white collar over total employment; so they are
able to capture the average e¤ect of o¤shoring on immigrants share and the indirect e¤ect
of o¤shoring on immigrants share through the share of skilled workers (white collar). They
nd that o¤shoring on average substitute for immigrants in production, and that the higher
is the skill level in rms employment (i.e. the higher is the rms need for competences that
immigrants on average do not own), the lower is the immigrants workers share in production,
this means that immigrants are less well endowed with the skills that are used intensely in the
domestic activities of o¤shoring rms.
Ivlevs and De Melo (2008) nd empirical evidence of the complementarity between emigra-
tion and inward FDI: a reduction in the relative supply of skilled labour (emigration) attracts
inward FDI (i.e. complementarity between immigration and o¤shoring). In particular from the
OLS estimation results that a 1% reduction in skilled labour supply (emigration) is associated
with a 0.019% of net inward FDI (as percentage of the GDP). Ivlevs and De Melo (2008) in
order to avoid endogeneity problem provided also an IV estimation (using the stock of migrants
in USA and Canada in 1980 as instrumental variable), obtaining that a 1% decrease in skilled
labour supply leads to a 0.022% increase in net inward FDI.
El Yaman, Kugler, Rapoport (2007) focused in particular on the skill composition of mi-
grants nding complementarity between outward FDI and skilled immigration and substitutabil-
ity between unskilled immigration and outward FDI. In a recent paper Olney (2009b) set a
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simple model to understand how rms respond to exogenous immigration shock in terms of re-
location of job; he concludes that low skilled immigration and o¤shoring are substitutes, that is,
an increase in low-skilled immigration leads to a reduction in the relocation of jobs (o¤shoring).
On the other hand, high skilled immigration leads to an increase in the relocation of jobs, so
high skilled immigration and o¤shoring are complements in production. Using data on 192
US Metropolitan statistical Areas from 1998 to 2004; he estimates the relocation behaviour of
rms in terms of rmsnet birth rate14 and rmsexpansion rate15 as response to an exogenous
change in high and low skilled immigration. Controlling for time and industry xed e¤ects he
shows that low skilled immigration has a signicant positive e¤ect and high skilled immigration
has a negative signicant e¤ect on the net birth rate of rms, conrming the idea that low
skilled immigration substitutes for o¤shoring, while high skilled immigration complements for
o¤shoring (the same results emerge when author use the expansion rate as dependent variable).
By using IV econometric estimation16, he nds that a 1% increase in the share of low-skilled
immigrants leads to a 0.11% increase in the net birth of rms in the metropolitan area (so
o¤shoring is deterred), while a 1% increase in the high-skilled share of immigrants leads to
a 0.26% decrease in net birth rate of rms (o¤shoring is stimulated). This paper introduces
(even if only from a theoretical point of view) an important dimension in the relation between
immigration and o¤shoring: are home rms tasks o¤shorable? If yes, immigration and outward
FDI are substitutes and the optimal choice collapses to a better relative cost choice. If some
tasks (say tasks housework, social services, restaurants waiter) are not o¤shorable, FDI and
immigration may be complements and immigrants may add some information on their origin
country reducing the FDIs risk.
On this direction moves the paper by Ottaviano, Peri and Wright (2010). From their




where est_birthc;t is the number of new rms in metropolitan area c at time t, est_deathc;t is the number of
death rms in metropolitan area c at time t, while estc;t is the total number of rms.
15net_ exp ansion_ratec;t =
est_ exp andingc;t est_contractingc;t
estc;t
where est_ exp andingc;t is the number of rms whose employment expanded in metropolitan area c at time t,
est_contractingc;t is the number of rms whose employment contracted in metropolitan area c at time t, while
estc;t is the total number of rms.
16He follows Card (2001) in dening the instrumental variable: the predicted share of immigrants is constructed
by assigning immigrants in the current year to the cities where previous migration waves from the same origin
country were located.
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the number of o¤shored tasks through a reduction in the number of tasks assigned to immigrants
and natives at home; (ii) a reduction in migration costs increase the number of tasks assigned
to immigrants through a reduction in tasks o¤shored or assigned to natives at home. So they
estimate the following equations:
[2.9] sD;s;t = Ds + 
D
t + bDO(imputed_offshs;t) + bDI(imputed_immis;t) + "
D
s;t
[2.10] sM;s;t = Ms + 
M
t + bMO(imputed_offshs;t) + bMI(imputed_immis;t) + "
M
s;t
[2.11] sO;s;t = Ds + 
D
t + bOO(imputed_offshs;t) + bOI(imputed_immis;t) + "
O
s;t
where sD;s;t, sM;s;t, sO;s;t are respectively the shares of less skilled employed native and
immigrants workers at home and the share of o¤shored employment; js and 
j
t are respectively
the individuals and time xed e¤ects for each j strategy; imputed_offshs;t is an index for the
o¤shoring activity in each sector; similarly imputed_immis;t is an index for the immigrants
presence in sectors. Coherently with their theoretical implications, they nd that an increase
in the ease of o¤shoring (imputed_offshs;t) implies a reduction in the share of native and
immigrants employments and a signicant increase in the share of o¤shored employment; while
an increase in immigration (imputed_immis;t) has no e¤ect on nativesshare employment, a
negative e¤ect on o¤shored employment and a positive e¤ect on the share of immigrants em-
ployment. One interesting implication is that, relying on these results, a barrier to immigration
(restrictive policy for example) implies that immigrants are more likely to be substituted by
o¤shore workers than by natives ones. From empirical studies on immigration and o¤shoring
it emerges an interesting regularity: it seems that micro level data studies found substitutabil-
ity between migration and o¤shoring while macro level data studies found complementarity
between migration and o¤shoring.
2.4 Conclusion
The aim of the chapter was to articulate the existing literature on the e¤ects of immigration on
host countries by di¤erent points of views. To this end we summarized the existing literature
on the e¤ects of immigration on both labour market and the economic performances in terms
of per capita GDP and growth. We may conclude that does not exist a consensus in giving a
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Bandyopadhyay and Wall (2007) substitutability theoretical -
Barba Navaretti, Bertola and Sembenelli (2008) substitutability empirical micro
Barry (2002) complementarity theoretical -
Buch, Kleinart and Toubal (2006) complementarity empirical macro
Docquier and Lodigiani (2007) complementarity empirical macro
El Yaman, Kugler and Rapoport (2007) substitutability empirical macro
Gao (2003) complementarity empirical macro
Ivlevs and De Melo (2008) complementarity both macro
Javorcik, Ozden, Spatareanu and Neagu (2006) complementarity empirical macro
Kugler and Rapoport (2005) complementarity empirical macro
Murat and Paba (2004) substitutability empirical micro
Olney (2009a) substitutability empirical micro
Ottaviano, Peri and Wright (2010) substitutability both micro
Ramaswami (1968) substitutability theoretical -
Tong (2005) complementarity empirical macro
Source : Author
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sign to the e¤ect of immigration on labour market outcome; from an empirical point of view,
a negative (rarely positive), but even small e¤ect of immigration has been found on wages in
host countries. This is coherent with the main conclusion of theoretical models concerning the
labour market e¤ects of immigration: it depends on the assumption about perfect/imperfect
substitutability between immigrants and native workers. If immigrants are assumed as perfect
substitutes for natives, thus a detrimental e¤ect of immigration on wages is derived; while if
immigrants are assumed as imperfect substitutes for natives, a positive e¤ect of immigrants on
wages is allowed and it depends on the degree of substitutability.
Literature on the e¤ects of immigrants on host countrys performances (per capita GDP)
has been divided into two main streams: (i) the one adopting the growth model framework,
(ii) the other adopting the accounting approach. In both cases the existing literature is not
wide because of problems in data availability and econometric problem on the endogeneity
of immigrants setting. But one main message can be clearly derived from this literature:
the e¤ect on per capita GDP depends on the assumption about the human capital content of
immigrants and on the time horizon. If immigrants are assumed as new born babies (zero capital
endowment) the e¤ect of immigration on per capita GDP will be negative, while if immigrants
are endowed with some human capital, a positive e¤ect on per capita GDP is allowed. So the
skill composition of immigration is a crucial dimension that has to be considered in analyzing
the e¤ects of immigration; because more skilled immigrants bring along them high human
capital content and the human capital content dilution by immigration may be o¤set. The time
horizon is important in analyzing the e¤ect of immigration: in the short run physical capital is
xed and immigration produces a high physical capital dilution and so a negative e¤ect on per
capita GDP is expected, while in the long run physical capital is free to adjust to the labour
supply shock and the e¤ect on per capita GDP may be null.
In the last section of the chapter we analysed the relation between immigration and o¤-
shoring by rms. If under the traditional Heckscher-Ohlin framework immigration deters o¤-
shoring (because of an increase in the return on capital), some recent theoretical models and
some empirical works nd a positive relation between immigration and o¤shoring. The un-
derlying idea is that immigrants reduce the cost of o¤shoring (by providing information about
their origin countries) and thus stimulate o¤shoring. Moreover it is interesting to notice that
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(gure 2.14) empirical papers using micro level data found substitutability between migration
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Chapter 3
Skilled Migration and Economic
Performance: evidence from OECD
countries
3.1 Introduction
The aim of the paper is to investigate the e¤ect of immigrants inows on host countrys
standard of living, by considering the e¤ect on per capita GDP variation. Looking at the
simple correlation between immigration ows and per capita GDP in host countries, we notice
a strong positive relation between them, but it is not easy to identify the direction of causality.
In this chapter by using instrumental variable estimation we are able to determine the e¤ects
of immigration ows and their human capital content on host countrys economic performances
in terms of changes in per capita GDP. If a positive e¤ect of skilled immigrants may be found,
interesting policy implications on skill selective policies can be drawn.
Growing international labour migration suggests the importance of this topic in international
economics: the percentage of foreign-born population over total population residing (legally)
in North America increased by less than 10% in 1990 to more than 14% in 2010 (estimated)1.
In Europe the stock of international migrants as a share of total population was 8.8% in 2005
1United Nations, Department of Social a¤airs "Trend in total migrants stock: the 2005 revision"
http://esa.un.org/migration
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and it is expected to become 9.5% in 2010. Thus migration has, potentially, a crucial role for
the comprehension of future economic development: does immigration a¤ect per capita GDP in
the host countries? Do tertiary educated immigrants a¤ect positively per capita GDP in host
countries? These are the main questions that the chapter intends to investigate. The debate
on the e¤ects of immigration on developed countries is wide and it concerns a lot of social
disciplines, among them economics has the role to investigate the economic related e¤ect of
immigration. There is a ourishing literature on the e¤ects of both international ows of capital
and trade on income growth (Michaely 1977; Borenztein, De Gregorio and Lee 1998; Frankel and
Romer 1999; De Mello 1999; Zhang 2001), but although migration can be similarly considered
as an international factor movement, the link between migration and income variation has
been scarcely analysed in literature. Up to now economists focused a lot, both theoretically
and empirically, on the labour markets e¤ect of immigration (Card 2001, 2005; Borjas 2003,
Aydemir and Borjas 2007, Ottaviano and Peri 2008), because the e¤ects of immigration have
been considered passing through the labour market. This is certainly true but also restrictive:
immigration, by increasing the labour force, will reduce capital labour ratio in the host country,
increasing return on capital and so generating investment opportunities and physical capital
accumulation (up to the point in which the marginal product of capital returns to its pre-
immigration shock value). Moreover immigrants may a¤ect total factor productivity in host
countries, since they may promote specialization/complementarities (Ottaviano and Peri 2008)
with natives increasing total factor productivity. Immigrants also bring new ideas reinforcing
agglomeration economies (Sparber 2010). On the other hand it is possible that immigration
induces the adoption of less productive technologies (unskilled labour intensive). For these
reasons, the e¤ect of immigration on host countries income cannot be analysed exclusively
through the labour market channel. Ortega and Peri (2009) analyse the e¤ect of immigrants on
the growth rate of each component of the GDP function (total factor productivity, employment
and physical capital used in production) and on the income growth itself. Finally immigration
may increase the host countrieshuman capital endowment (according to their skill level) and
so a¤ecting per capita GDP variation (Dolado, Goria and Ichino 1994). This is the channel
we want to analyse by investigating the e¤ects of high skilled immigrants on host countries
changes in per capita GDP.
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The importance of understanding the e¤ects of immigrants and their human capital content
on host economies concerns both policy implications, by clearing the consequences of skill
selective immigration policies on income, and the welfare of natives in receiving countries. The
underlying idea is that immigrants not only increase the countrys endowment of low wage
workers, leading to a decrease in per capita GDP (because of human capital dilution), but they
also bring some human capital along them allowing for a potential positive e¤ect on per capita
GDP by increasing the human capital level in destination countries (Benhabib 1996; Kemnitz
2001). This chapter provides an econometric estimation of the impact of immigration ows
and their human capital content on host countries economic performances (in terms of per
capita GDP variation about its time mean). In providing empirical evidence of the previous
questions, in this paper we follow the procedure by Frankel and Romer (1999) (recently adopted
by Ortega and Peri 2009). To build the instrumental variables for international migration we
rstly estimate bilateral ows of migration using a gravity-style model, and then we aggregate
the tted values by destination countries. In the second part of the paper we use instrumental
variables to investigate the e¤ects of immigrantsows on income variation. With respect the
existing literature in this eld, we try to keep the e¤ect of immigration on changes in per capita
GDP by stressing the role of the human capital content by immigrants. The rest of the chapter
is organized as follows. Paragraph 3.2 provides a review of existing theoretical and empirical
literature on the e¤ects of immigration on income in host economy. Paragraph 3.3 is devoted to
our econometric analysis. In particular paragraph 3.3.1 presents some stylized facts; paragraph
3.3.2 discusses some problems and solutions concerning the empirical strategy; paragraph 3.3.3
explains how we built the instrumental variables and how good they are (because this is a crucial
point in this literature); while paragraph 3.3.4 presents respectively the e¤ects of immigration
ows on per capita GDP. Final paragraph concludes.
3.2 Review of literaure
From a theoretical point of view the e¤ect of immigration on host countrys income level and
growth has been widely treated. Early models on the e¤ect of labour mobility considered
immigration in an extended version of the traditional Solow-Swan model. Using a simple
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Cobb-Douglas production function where only physical capital and labour (in e¢ ciency units)
contribute to produce output, by assuming immigrants endowed with zero physical capital,
immigration is like an increase in the countrys unskilled population, so that everything else
being constant, immigration leads to a lower per capita income because of the local physical
capital dilution.
In the augmented Solow-Swan model framework (Mankiw, Romer and Weil 1992), where
human capital also contributes to the production process, if immigrants are assumed to bring
human capital along them, human capital dilution may be o¤set. In this case the key to assess
the impact of immigration on per capita GDP is whether immigrants bring enough human
capital to o¤set its dilution in the host country. If immigrants own a low quantity of human
capital, their impact is similar to a simple faster population growth in slowing per capita GDP.
If immigrantshuman capital is higher than natives, income will be speeded up (Benhabib 1996;
Friedberg and Hunt 1995).2 Dolado, Goria and Ichino (1994) modied the Mankiw, Romer and
Weil (1992) model by considering immigration as a source for both working population growth
rate and human capital accumulation.3 They consider an economy in which output is produced
with labour, human and physical capital by using a Cobb-Douglas constant return to scale
technology. Immigration has been introduced in the model by modifying the working population
growth rate (including the net immigration rate) and by assuming immigrants endowed with
some human capital that modies the human capital accumulation equation. Using this setting
authors conclude that immigration has negative e¤ect on output and growth in host country,
while a higher human capital level owned by immigrants has a positive e¤ect on both output
and income growth rate.4
So we may conclude from a theoretical perspective that, by modifying traditional growth
model and assuming perfect substitutability between native and foreign born immigrants, the
e¤ect of immigration depends on the kind of immigrants: if immigrants own a low quantity of
human capital they negatively a¤ect output variation; but the higher is their human capital
content, the higher is their (positive) contribution on per capita GDP variation.
2For more details on the portability of human capital by immigrants, see Friedberg (2000).
3Notice that in this model immigrants do not contribute to physical capital accumulation.
4This conclusion holds in the more realistic case in which immigrants own less aggregate human capital than
natives.
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Although theoretical works have thrown light on the relation between immigration and per
capita GDP, only few empirical studies have been conducted and not a clear picture emerges
from these. A seminal paper on the e¤ect of immigration on per capita income growth was by
Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1992), they nd that immigration has no e¤ect on income growth.
Dolado, Goria and Ichino (1994) using a panel of 23 OECD countries in the period 1960 - 1985,
found a negative e¤ect of immigration on per capita income growth, concluding that the reason
of such negative impact of immigration relies on the fact that immigrants in OECD countries
own lower human capital than natives.
Recently empirical papers on the e¤ect of immigration on GDP have used the so called "ac-
counting approach", which consists of analysing the e¤ect of immigration on every component
of per capita output (total factor productivity, physical capital accumulation, employment).
The paper by Ortega and Peri (2009) adopts this approach and has the merit to nd a new way
to solve the immigrantslocalization endogeneity problem by using the estimated bilateral im-
migration ows (without wage di¤erential or other economic determinants of migration). They
use 2SLS estimates to analyse the e¤ect of immigration on every component of the per capita
GDP function. In particular they show that an increasing immigration leads to: (i) an increas-
ing employment growth and (ii) an increasing physical capital growth. They also estimate the
e¤ect of immigration on per capita GDP growth nding that a 1% increase in immigrants ows
entails about a 1% increase in per capita GDP growth rate. Ortega (2008) by estimating the
e¤ect of immigration on per capita GDP and labour productivity (per hour worked GDP) nds
that a 10% increase in immigration induced population growth leads to a 3.8% increase in GDP
but to a 6.2% and 6.7% reductions in GDP per capita and per hour worked GDP. Felbermayr,
Hiller and Sala (2010) investigate the e¤ect of immigrants (by using the stock of immigrants
in destination country) on per capita GDP in the host countries. Using a IV cross-section ap-
proach and controlling for institutional quality, trade and nancial openness they nd positive
correlation between immigration and per capita GDP: a 1% increase in the migrants stock leads
to a 0.22% increase in per capita GDP. Similarly Bellini, Ottaviano, Pinelli and Prarolo (2009)
nd that the share of foreigners in total population has a positive e¤ect of per capita GDP in
EU destination regions.
Sparber (2010) uses data on 48 US states from 1980-200 to explore the relationship between
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diversity (that can be seen as a measure of immigrants employment)5 and per capita GDP
variation. Instrumental variable estimation shows a positive and signicant e¤ect of diversity
on per capita GDP, but using state xed e¤ects to account for time invariant income explanatory
variable (other that diversity) coe¢ cient becomes insignicant.
The former empirical investigations on the e¤ects of immigrants on per capita GDP do not
take into account an important feature arising from theoretical growth papers: the human cap-
ital content of immigrants. It seems that, although theoretical models suggest the importance
of the human capital content of immigrants in determining the e¤ect of immigration on per
capita GDP, empirical papers did not take into account this dimension in estimating the e¤ects
of immigrants ows on income. This is the reason why we decided to estimate the e¤ects of
immigration ows on per capita GDP variation taking into account the human capital content
of immigrants.
3.3 Empirical strategy
The main nding of theoretical models in literature is that the e¤ect of immigration on income
depends on the human capital content of immigrants. So, by increasing the human capital owned
by each immigrant, host countries may mitigate the expected negative e¤ect of immigration
on per capita GDP. In this paper we approximate the human capital content of immigrants
by their skill level. Thus we analyse the e¤ect of immigrants inows and their skill level on
income in destination countries:
[3.1] ln yd;t = d+ 1 ln(immi_shared;t) + 2[ln(immi_shared;t)  ln(immi_skilld)] + "d;t6
Where yd;t is per capita GDP in destination country d and at time t, immi_share is the
share of immigrants inows over total population and immi_skill is a measure of the human





where s is the state, t is time and r is the race of employees (Asia, Blacks, Hispanic, Whites, Others).
6The variable ln(immi_skilld) could not be put in the estimated equation because it is time invariant and it
is perfectly correlated with the xed e¤ects d: Since the e¤ect of the skill proportion of immigrants is kept by
d we do not incur in omitted variable problem. Moreover, we tried to estimate a LSDV model (that produces
the same coe¢ cient as a within estimation) in order to be allowed to insert the ln(immi_skilld) variable, but
the associated coe¢ cient was not statistically di¤erent from zero.
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capital content of immigrants inows. The xed e¤ects d controls for unobserved structural
di¤erences between countries that are time invariant (for example the initial level of technology,
resource endowments, climate institutions). The human capital content of immigrants has been
approximated in two ways: (i) as the share between tertiary educated over total immigrants
stock; (ii) as the share between tertiary over primary educated immigrants stock (the so called
"selection ratio"). Since we used a xed e¤ects panel data model (within estimator)7 to estimate
equation [3.1], by looking at 1 coe¢ cient we are able to assess the e¤ect of an increase in the
immigrants inows (with respect to its time mean) on the variation of per capita GDP about
its time mean, conditioned to a zero skill content of immigrants. By looking at 2 coe¢ cient we
also know how being skilled among immigrants changes the e¤ect on per capita GDP variation.
This kind of empirical works are not common in literature, exceptions are Dolado, Goria
and Ichino (1994), Felbermayer, Hiller and Sala (2010), Ortega and Peri (2009) and Bellini
et.al. (2009), because of a series of econometric problems such as endogeneity from migrants
localization, internal migration8 and data availability.9 To this end the empirical strategy
consists of two main parts, in the rst we build the instrumental variables using the Frankel
and Romer (1999) approach also used by Ortega and Peri (2009) to solve the endogeneity
problem. In the second part we estimate equation [3.1] by using a 2SLS panel data model.
3.3.1 Data and descriptive evidence
In this chapter we combine an international panel data set on bilateral ows of migration
from 86 poor and developing countries to 24 OECD countries with some macroeconomic and
geographical variables concerning both origin and destination countries. Data on migration
7We could not estimate a simple rst di¤erence panel data model, because the lagged dependent variable
would be endogenous implying to insert an instrument for it among the other instrumental variables. This does
not allow us to solve for the immigrants localization endogeneity.
8The problem of internal migration does not a¤ect our analysis because it will be conduct at country level.
Internal migration introduces a negative bias in sub-national level estimations (Hanson 2008).
9Low quality data problem can be solved by providing some reasons for caution in using the foreign born by
total residents: (i) a considerable number of foreign born workers in manufacturing industries are skilled (and
the education level is hardly comparable between host and origin country); (ii) not all native born workers are
skilled and (iii) not all immigrants participate in the labor market, particularly following an intense process of
family regrouping in recent years (Friedberg and Hunt 1995).
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come from the International Migration Statistics (IMS) data set from OECD.stat10. Notice
that this kind of data do not cover illegal migration. In this paper we use ows of migration
from 1998 to 2007.11 Macroeconomic variables such as per capita GDP12, per hour worked
GDP, population, number of patents, public and private expenditure in tertiary education13
and bilateral aid have been taken from OECD.stat as well. From CEPII we take geographic
variables such as the distance between countries, dummy variable for common language, past
colonial relationship and contiguity of countries. Finally from Docquier, Lowell and Marfouk
(2007) database we take data concerning the skill level of immigrants. This dataset contains
the stock in 2000 and 1991 of immigrants and native workforce by education level and origin
country. Before going to the econometric estimation we want to point out some descriptive
evidence on the settlement of immigrants and their skill level.
Figure 3.1 shows the share of tertiary educated over total immigrants stock and the share of
immigrants over total population in 2000 for each destination country; as one may expect the
main immigrants endowed countries are Luxembourg, Australia and Switzerland; while Italy,
Hungary, Portugal and Finland are the less endowed. By the point of view of the skill level
of immigrants, Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand and United States have the highest
share of tertiary educated immigrants, this is certainly the consequence of skilled immigrants
oriented policies.14 It would be interesting to compare the human capital content of immi-
grants with those owned by natives, because as concluded by Dolado, Goria and Ichino (1994)
immigration has negative e¤ects on both per capita output and growth if the human capital
level owned by immigrants is lower than those for natives. Second and third columns in gure
3.1 show respectively the ratio between tertiary educated over total immigrants and the same
10Here immigrants are dened as the number of foreign born individuals entering in the country with a residence
permit at least for one year. So our measure is una¤ected by national naturalization policies.
11Notice that the disaggregated data on migration ows (by origin and destination countries) dont cover the
100% of total immigrants inows in each destination countries, for example the total immigration inow in Italy
in 2007 by origin country is the 91% of the total immigrants inows of immigrants; so the disaggregated data set
contains some zeros for some origin-destination pairs. So some of these observations are truly zero ows, while
others correspond probably to small ows.
12Per capita GDP is provided in USD at constant prices.
13Expenditure in tertiary education was initially provided in national currency at current price; but we trans-
form them in USD by using exchange rates from UIC dataset and we clear for ination but dividing for consumer
price index.
14 Immigrants selective immigration policies have been carried out in di¤erent ways by countries. For example
United States adopts the so called H-1B visa to select skilled immigrants, but other systems are the Canadian
or Australian "point system".
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ratio for natives; the tertiary educated share for immigrants is higher than those for natives
in Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom.
A second feature arising from the data is the decreasing persistency of immigrantsinows
localization along time (gure 3.2). One may notice that the stock of immigrants in 1991 is
well correlated (slope statistically di¤erent from zero) with the inows of immigrants over total
population in 1998, but not well correlated with the inows of immigrants over total population
in 2007. Figure 3.3 shows the positive and statistically signicant correlation between the share
of tertiary educated over total immigrants in 2000 and the stock of tertiary educated over
total native workforce. It is interesting to notice that United States and Canada have the
highest shares of tertiary educated immigrants and natives; on the contrary Portugal and Italy
have the lowest share of tertiary educated immigrants and natives. Figure 3.3 also shows the
relation between the share of tertiary educated over total immigrants in 2000 and the share
of immigrants over total resident population, it seems that tertiary educated immigrants go in
average where all other immigrants localize.
3.3.2 The empirical approach: problems and solutions
One main problem arises in empirical estimation when migration is involved as independent
variable: endogeneity from immigrants localization choice. Endogeneity arises if immigrants
choose where to stay on the basis of countrys wage or GDP di¤erentials within origin and
destination countries. Thus it is true not only that immigration drives economic performances
(or labour market changes), but also that local economic performances drive immigration. This
problem leads to a biased estimation of the e¤ects of immigration on economic performances.
The endogeneity problem can be solved by using instrumental variables: if one can nd a vari-
able correlated with the change in immigrantspresence but independent by the local economic
performance, the bias due to immigration choice can be removed. When immigrants choose the
country where to stay, they can take into account also other aspects of a region, such as existing
networks and the presence of a community with the same culture and language. Thus, besides
economic performance reasons, immigrants may tend to settle in countries (or cities) with high
density of immigrants. Since the stock of existing immigrants in a region is unlikely to be
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correlated with current economic shocks (notice that a su¢ cient time lag is necessary), historic
settlement pattern may solve the endogeneity problem. Figure 3.4 shows not statistically signif-
icant, even if positive, correlation between the stock of immigrants in 1991 and the per capita
GDP in 1998 and 2007.15 Altonji and Card (2001) used the stock of immigrants in 1970 as an
instrumental variable for the change in immigrant population between 1970 and 1980 in USA
cities. The logic is the following: new immigrants tend to go where other immigrants already
reside, but this variable is uncorrelated with local economic outcomes or wages. An alternative
way to overcome the endogeneity problem was recently proposed by Mayda (2010) and used by
Ortega and Peri (2009). They estimated the gravity-push bilateral immigration ows without
economic determinants, and thus the t of this regression was used as an instrumental variable
(by aggregating data for each destination country). In this way the instrumental variable results
to be well correlated with immigration ows and mainly independent from economic shocks.16
In this chapter we follow the former approach.17 Hence, our empirical approach consists of two
steps; rstly well estimate the bilateral ows of immigrants (both total and skilled ones) by
using geographic and strictly exogenous determinants of migration,18 and well aggregate the
estimated ows of immigrants from all origin countries for each destination country (in this
way for each destination country we have estimated immigrants inows not driven by economic
performance as instruments).19 The second step is to estimate the e¤ects of immigration on
host countries income as in equation [3.1] by using a 2SLS estimation.
3.3.3 Constructing the instruments
Our nal purpose is to estimate the e¤ect of both immigrantsinow and its skill content on
host countrys income variation, thus we have two potentially endogenous variables in our main
15We chosen 1998 and 2007 as starting and ending years of our panel.
16This is true under the condition that regressors used to estimate the bilateral immigration ows are inde-
pendent from any economic shock.
17We also tried to use the instrument by Card (2001) using the stock of immigrants in 1990 as a base year for
our instrumental variable. But we preferred the approach by Ortega and Peri (2009) because it better explains
the actual immigration ows than the instrument à la Card (2001).
18For example we did not use wage di¤erential between origin and destination country that has a strong
explanatory power for migrants ows but it would introduce a bias in our estimates.
19We cannot put the determinants of immigrants ows directly as instrumental variables in the 2SLS procedure
because most of them are time invariant and they would be perfectly correlated with the xed e¤ect in the rst
stage regression.
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empirical equations [3.1]. So we need at least two instrumental variables to correctly identify
the model and overcome the endogeneity problem. As anticipated in the former section we build
these two instruments by estimating bilateral ows of both total and skilled migration using
geographic and strictly exogenous determinants. An instrumental variable has to satisfy two
requirements: it must explain quite well the endogenous variable (relevance) and it has to be
orthogonal to the error process (validity). In what follows we build the instrumental variables
and we will discuss the quality of the instruments providing both qualitative arguments on the
exogeneity of variables used to build our instruments and formal test of relevance and validity
of the so built instruments.
The bilateral migration ows equations
Our instrumental variables are the estimated immigrantsinows resulting from the estimation
of bilateral migration ows from poor countries to 24 OECD countries (gure 3.5 reports the
countries of origin and destination used in the estimation). Although for the estimation of the
empirical equation [3.1] we just need the inows of immigrants in every destination country from
all over the world, we decided to build instrumental variables by estimating bilateral immigra-
tion ows because it enables us to use strictly exogenous variable as migration determinants.20
We used data at country level because, as Borjas and Katz (2007), and Ottaviano and Peri
(2008) argued, the country is the appropriate unit with which to analyze the e¤ects of migra-
tion. The reason is the high degree of mobility of workers and physical capital within country.
In our setting we need two instruments, one should look at explaining the total bilateral mi-
gration ows from poor to destination countries, and the other looking at the skilled migrants
ows (since the interacted variable in the main equation [3.1] points to measure the e¤ect of
being skilled among immigrants). So we estimated the bilateral inows of immigrants by using
two sets of explanatory variables: one set of variables explaining total immigration (both high
and low skilled immigrants inows), the other set explaining high skilled immigrantsinows.
In dening the set of variables explaining the overall bilateral migration ows (equation [3.2])
20 In fact geographic variables as distance, past colonial relationship, common language are shown being good
migration determinants (Mayda 2008; Berthelemy, Beuran and Maurel 2009; Ortega and Peri 2009) and they
could be used only by estimating bilateral immigration ows.
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we use three main features in literature: (i) migration is positively correlated with bilateral aid
(Berthelemy, Beuran, Maurel 2009); (ii) migration is positively correlated with past immigrants
settlements (Card 2001; Beine, Docquier and Ozden 2009); (iii) geographic variables are im-
portant to estimate bilateral migration ows (Mayda 2010; Berthelemy, Beuran, Maurel 2009;
Ortega and Peri 2009). Thus the overall bilateral ows for immigrants have been estimated by
using the following equation:
[3.2] ln(immi_flowsd;o;t) = o;t + 1 ln(aidd;o;t) + 2 ln(immi_stockd;1991)+
+3distanced;o + 4languaged;o+
+5contiguityd;o + 6colonyd;o + &o;d;t
To be sure about the exogeneity of the tted immigration share from [3.2] we briey discuss
the exogeneity (and the intuition behind) of each regressor. It is straightforward to consider
bilateral aid (aidd;o;t) as independent from the destination countrys economic performance
because of bilateral aid is a political exogenous decision by national governments (as an example
the overall aid expenditure by United States is lower than the aid expenditure of Portugal, Spain
and New Zealand) and also depends on the goodness of political relation with the receiving
country;21 moreover bilateral aid does not a¤ect directly per capita income in donors countries
except for the attractiveness of immigrants. As in Berthelemy, Beuran and Maurel (2009)
bilateral aid is expected to have a positive e¤ect on bilateral migration ows through the so
called "attraction" e¤ect: more bilateral aid from a "rich country" (destination country in our
setting) to a "poor country" (origin country in our case) intensies the attractiveness of the
donor for workers in the "poor countries"; moreover bilateral aid increases the information in
poor countries about the donor and it will reduce migration costs. The stock of immigrants
in destination country in 1991 (immi_stockd;1991) is expected to have a positive e¤ect on
bilateral migration because immigrants already living in the destination country reduce the
cost of information on how to get a job in the new country, on social system, immigration
policy and culture. The stock of immigrants in 1991 may be considered exogenous because of
the su¢ cient time lag with respect per capita income in the main equation [3.1] (where the
21Moreover the simple correlation index between per capita GDP and overall international aid by each desti-
nation countries is 0.196.
77
dependent variable goes from 1998 to 2007). Moreover, the stock of immigrants in a decade
before has been used as instrumental variable in various papers in literature (Card 2001, Cortes
2008).22 Evidence of the exogeneity of the stock of immigrants in 1991 with respect economic
performance in 1998-2007 is provided in gure 3.4, where the correlation between the per capita
GDP and the stock of immigrants is positive but not statistically di¤erent from zero. Finally,
geographic variables concerning destination and origin countries are distance (distanced;o),23
the existence of a common language (languaged;o), the existence of a present or past colonial
link (colonyd;o) and geographic contiguity (contiguityd;o). All the geographic variables can be
easily considered as exogenous. The distance between origin and destination countries may be
considered as a proxy for the cost of migration, the further away are the two countries the
higher is the cost for migration. Common land border is likely to encourage migration because
of lower travel time (and costs). Past or present colonial relationship should increase bilateral
ows of migration because of a strong political relation between the two countries.
The second instrumental variable comes from the estimated bilateral skilled immigrants
ows as in the following equation [3.3]:
[3.3] ln(skilled_immi_flowsd;o;t) = o;t + 1 ln(edu_expd;t) + 2 ln(patentd;t)+
+3 ln(skilled_immi_stockd;o;1991) + 4distanced;o
+5languaged;o + 6contiguityd;o + 7colonyd;o + &o;d;t
where the skilled immigrants bilateral ows have been computed as the product between
the bilateral ows of immigrants at time t and the share of tertiary educated immigrants stock
in 2000:24






22The underlying idea is that unobserved factors determining that more immigrants decided to locate in country
"A" rather than in country "B" in 1991 are not correlated with changes in the relative economic performances
by the two countries.
23 In our estimation we used the population weighted distance, where the distance in Km between the largest
cities in the two countries (origin, destination) is weighted for the share of those cities over the total countrys
population (see Frankel and Romer 1999). This is because the larger is a country the farther is the distance
from other countries, so if we do not weight the distance for the population we may end up with migration ows
positively a¤ected by distance.
24Data on the stock of migrants in 1990 has been used to compute the ows of skilled migrants up to 2001.
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In order to estimate the skilled immigrants ows we used regressors explaining mainly ter-
tiary educated immigrants ows. Destination countries with both a high expenditure in tertiary
education25 (edu_expd;t) and an high number of patents26 (patent) should attract in particular
tertiary educated immigrants (similar reason for the stock of tertiary educated immigrants in
1991, skilled_immi_stockd;o;1991). These variables may also be considered exogenous with re-
spect per capita GDP because it is di¢ cult to think that expenditure in education and patents
could have relevant e¤ects on income in the same year,27 except through their impact on the at-
tractiveness of skilled immigrants. Moreover, the expenditure in tertiary level education may be
considered exogenous with respect per capita GDP because this kind of expenditure is mainly
policy driven (it is not necessarily true that the more is the per capita GDP the more is the
expenditure in tertiary level education). The number of patents depends upon the innovation
activities by rms and institution and scarcely depends on the income in destination countries.
Finally, the stock of skilled immigrants in 1991 may considered exogenous because of a su¢ -
cient time lag with respect economics performances in main equation [3.1]. After estimating
equations [3.2] and [3.3] we have the tted values for bilateral ows of immigration, then we
can aggregate these ows for each destination country ending up with the estimated inows of
both total and skilled immigrants in each destination country form 1998 to 2007, and these will
be our two instrumental variables.
Results
Equation [3.2] and [3.3] have been estimated by a xed e¤ect panel data model, the origin-
time xed e¤ects capture any economic, demographic and cost determinant of migration out
of country o which varies over time; these xed e¤ects capture the so called "push-factors" of
immigration which depend only on the conditions in the countries of origin (they are indepen-
dent of the destination countries characteristics) such as the per capita GDP, wage level in
the origin countries or the share of young over the total population. Since the xed e¤ect is
origin country but also time specic, it will keep also some historical (exogenous) shocks in
25 It is the expenditure of public and private institutions.
26Number of patent applications to EPO per thousands of inhabitants in the inventors country of residence.
27We know that in the long run expenditure in education and innovation activities bring to raise income, but
in our estimation they are used at the same year of income.
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the immigration ows. For example, the 2004 European Union enlargement probably caused a
great increase in the emigration rate from new member countries toward old member countries
(especially for those with common borders); this kind of shocks have been taken into account
by the origin-time xed e¤ects. We decided to use origin country-time xed e¤ects because we
want explicitly account for the geographic variables that are origin-destination specic; more-
over we could not use destination-time xed e¤ects because they would keep some destination
countrys specic economic aspects. The geographic variables are destination-origin country
specic and so capture the xed bilateral cost of migration.
Figure 3.6 shows the results from the estimated equation [3.2].28 All the explanatory vari-
ables are strongly signicant and, as we expected, bilateral aid positively a¤ects migration
ows from origin to destination country, this is coherent with results in Berthelemy, Beuran
and Maurel (2009). The stock of immigrants in destination countries in 1991 has a positive
e¤ect on migration ows conrming a well known result in literature (Card 2001). Geographic
variables are signicant. As we argued, common language, contiguity and colonial relationship
a¤ect positively bilateral migration ows, while distance negatively a¤ects migration ows. This
result is coherent with both Mayda (2010), Ortega and Peri (2009) and Berthelemy, Beuran
and Maurel (2009). The tted values of regression [3.2] are the estimated bilateral ows of
immigrants from origin countries to destination countries. Notice that the set of destination
countries has been removed from the set of origin countries.29
Figure 3.7 shows the results for estimated equation [3.3].30 As we expected both the ex-
penditure in tertiary level education and the number of patents in destination countries attract
the inows of tertiary educated immigrants (coe¢ cients positive and signicant). Coe¢ cients
associated to geographic variables have the same signs as in estimation [3.2] (except for colonial
relationship which now is not signicant). Origin countries are mainly poor or developing coun-
tries, so on the average with a worse educational system than in rich countries. For this reason,
28Notice that although we have 24 destination countries, 86 origin countries and 10 years, we estimated equation
[3.2] using just 4945 observations because of a huge number of missing values for bilateral ows of immigrants
and international aid in OECD dataset.
29This choice has been forced by the fact that bilateral ows of aid in OECD database did not include
destination countries as receiving aid countries.
30Notice that although we have 24 destination countries, 86 origin countries and 10 years, we estimated equation
[3.3] using just 8447 observations because of a huge number of missing values for bilateral ows of immigrants
in OECD dataset.
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the estimated values of bilateral ows keep those migrants with a lower quality of education
than natives even if formally they are tertiary educated as well. Since the bilateral immigration
ows may be left censored at zero, as a robustness check we also estimated equations [3.2] and
[3.3] by using a panel tobit model. The underlying idea is that the ow of immigrants is broadly
a continuous variable but it is subject to a lower limit.31 The result of the tobit estimation is
shown in the last column in gures 3.6 and 3.7, the values of the coe¢ cients are mainly the
same as those for the within estimations, the correlation indexes between the tted values using
within (OLS) and tobit estimators are close to one. Moreover the agglomeration of zeros in the
data set is negligible, so the bias due to a simple OLS estimation is negligible too. Because the
agglomeration of zeros in the data set is negligible and the tted values resulting from the OLS
estimation are more similar to the actual values in term of magnitude, we use the tted values
of the OLS model as instrumental variable in our 2SLS estimation.32
The quality of the instruments
An instrumental variable must satisfy two requirements: it must be correlated with the endoge-
nous variables (relevance) and orthogonal to the error process (validity). The former condition
may be tested by looking at the t of the rst stage regressions; usually one should look at the
R2 or at the F-stat of joint signicance of the instruments in the rst stage regression. Unfor-
tunately, these indicators may not be su¢ ciently informative because we have two endogenous
regressors. Indeed it may be the case that only one of the two instruments is highly correlated
with the two endogenous regressors and the other is just noise, giving however high rst stage
R2 or F-stat in the rst stage regressions, but the model is basically unidentied.
In order to show the relevance of the so built instrumental variables, in gure 3.8 we report
the scatter plots of the actual values for immigrantsinows, both total and skilled one, against
the tted values of respectively estimated equations [3.2] and [3.3]. The correlation between
actual values and tted values is positive and quite signicant, so our instruments are good
proxies for actual values of immigrants inows. To strengthen this evidence we also regress
31See also Beine, Docquier and Ozden (2009) and Felbermayr, Hiller and Sala (2010).
32Results of the 2SLS procedure using the estimated bilateral immigrants ows using tobit estimation are equal
to those by using OLS.
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actual values of migration against the tted values from equations [3.2] and [3.3] and a constant
term, results are shown in gure 3.9. As expected the coe¢ cient of the tted values of total
immigrants ows is signicant and close to one in explaining the actual values of total migration
ows; similarly the estimated values of skilled migration ows has a signicant coe¢ cient close
to one in explaining the ows of skilled migrants. Finally we also look at the Kleibergen-Paap
F statistic as a weak identication test (results are in gure 3.10) and we can reject the null of
weakly identied rst stage equation.
Unfortunately we cannot directly test the validity of the instrumental variables (Sargan
or Hansen test) because the Hansen J test for overidentifying restriction is not valid in the
just identied model (Cameron and Trivedi 2009). So rstly we rely on the former discussion
about the exogeneity of the determinants of bilateral migration ows but for the estimation
[3.1] where the endogeneity problem is crucial we also provide a formal overidentifying test by
adding three most probably orthogonal (even if irrelevant)33 instruments and test a subset of
overidentifying restriction (Baum, Scha¤er and Stillman 2003). The idea is to transform the
model into an overidentied model, in order to have a group of orthogonal instruments and
a group of suspect non-orthogonal instruments (i.e. our actual instruments described in the
former section); thus we estimate a restricted model34 with only the orthogonal instruments
and an unrestricted model with all the instruments (containing the suspect instruments). If
the inclusion of suspect instruments increases signicantly the Hansen J statistics, we would
have good reasons for doubting the orthogonality of our suspect instruments.35 We could not
reject the null of exogeneity of suspect instruments, so we may conclude that the estimated
ows of total and skilled migrants (from equation [3.2] and [3.3]) are valid instruments for the
estimation of equation [3.1].
33We dont care about relevance of the added instruments because they are used only to test the exogeneity
of our two actual instruments.
34Since the restricted model has to be identied as well, the number of added and surely orthogonal instruments
has to be at least equal to the number of problematic variables.
35Practically, we added three orthogonal instruments with respect per capita GDP, from the OECD stat we
choose the number of deaths for suicide and for diabetes per 100000 inhabitants and the alcohol consumption
per capita.
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3.3.4 Estimates of immigrations e¤ects on income variation
Specication
Having our two instrumental variables, we are allowed to estimate the e¤ect of immigrants and
their skill level on per capita GDP by using equation [3.1]. In panel data context, it is often
assumed that observations on the same individual (cluster) in two di¤erent time periods are
correlated (Baum, Scha¤er and Stillman 2003), but observations on two di¤erent individuals
are not; so in estimating equation [3.1] we properly accounted for cluster robust standard errors.
By estimating equation [3.1] using a xed e¤ects model, 1 is the elasticity of a variation of
unskilled immigrants inows about its mean (conditional to having zero tertiary educated share
of immigrants) on per capita GDP variation about its time mean; while 2 gives us the e¤ect
of being tertiary educated among immigrants on per capita GDP variation. Thus, from what
we know about the related theoretical literature, we expect 1 < 0 and 2 > 0: So potentially
the e¤ect of a selective immigration policy (aimed to increase the share of tertiary educated
over total immigrants) on per capita GDP can be evaluated by looking at 2: As a proxy for
the human capital content of immigrants has been used the share between tertiary educated
immigrants stock over the total immigrants in each destination country, this measure points to
evaluate the e¤ects of an increase in the human capital content by immigrants (due for example
to a selective immigration policy). Notice that the role of the level of tertiary educated home
born workers is kept by the xed e¤ect (the idea is that the lower is the endowment of native
high skilled workers, the higher is the positive e¤ects of a high skilled immigrants). As stated in
the former section, an OLS model introduces a bias in our estimation, so we need an IV panel
model (2SLS).36 So in the rst stage regressions we need at least two instrumental variables to
correctly identify the model. Our instruments are two estimated immigrants inows in [3.2] and
[3.3], aggregated for each destination country and weighted for the population in each country.
The destination countrys xed e¤ect in [3.1] explains all those factors that are country specic
and may inuence per capita GDP; they reect for instance di¤erences in the initial level of
e¢ ciency or technology between countries.




Figure 3.11 reports the estimation of equation [3.1] by using simple OLS model (xed e¤ects
panel model) and IV panel model. The coe¢ cients associated to the share of immigrants inows
are negative and signicant for both OLS and IV estimation37. The coe¢ cients associated
to the interacted variable are positive and very signicant. The results for the Durbin-Wu-
Hausman test in gure 3.11 conrm the bias in the OLS estimation due to the endogeneity
problem.38 So we have to look at the IV estimation results, and we may conclude that a 1%
increase in zero human capital endowed immigrants inows variation leads to a 1.1% reduction
in per capita GDP variation, but being skilled among immigrants mitigates this negative e¤ect.
Since the coe¢ cient associated to the immigrants share is always greater than the coe¢ cient
associated to the interacted variable (skill content of immigration), we may conclude that being
tertiary educated among immigrants positively a¤ects per capita GDP but not enough to clear
the negative e¤ect of immigration.39 With respect the paper by Mariya and Tritah (2009),
which has the merit to accounting for immigrantsheterogeneity in determining the e¤ect on
per capita GDP, here we nd strong and signicant positive e¤ect of being skilled among
immigrants on host countrieseconomic performances.
Figure 3.10 reports the rst stage regressions results, our instrumental variables explain well
our problematic variables: all coe¢ cients are statistically positive and di¤erent from zero, the
R2 of the rst stages are quite good and the F-stat tests for zero slopes seem to conrm the
37As one may easily notice from gures 3.11, 3.12 and 3.13 coe¢ cients estimated using IV are greater than
those estimated using OLS. This may be due to the so called attenuation bias: measurement error in the right
hand side variables, this implies the inconsistency of the OLS estimatior and a bias in the coe¢ cient toward
zero. Since the IV estimation clears for this problem, the IV coe¢ cient is expected to be higher (in absolute
value) than the OLS coe¢ cient for both immigration share and the interacted variable, and this in fact is the
case in our estimation results. More intuitively, OLS estimate is determined by the partial correlation between
income and immigrants share, while the IV estimate is determined by the partial correlation between income
and the component of the immigrants share explained by our instruments. Thus, mechanically, the fact that
the OLS estimate is smaller than the IV estimate means that incomes partial association with the component
of immigrants share that is not correlated with the instrument is weaker than its partial association with the
component that is correlated.
38The Durbin-Wu-Hanson test investigates if the correlation between the actual ows of immigrants are un-
correlated with the error component (exogeneity). Under the hypothesis that actual immigrants ows are un-
correlated with the error term, the OLS estimation are unbiased (as IV estimation) and e¢ cient; so OLS and IV
coe¢ cients di¤ers only because of sampling error. Since we can reject the null hypothesis, we conclude that OLS
coe¢ cients di¤er from IV, so OLS estimation are biased because of endogeneity of actual immigrants ows.
39Even by assuming a share of tertiary educated immigrants equal to one, the overall e¤ect on per capita GDP
variation is still negative.
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jointly signicance of instrumental variables. But, unfortunately in presence of two endogenous
variables (as in this case) the usual rules of thumbs may be misleading, so we computed the weak
identication test (adjusted for the robust cluster heterogeneity) by using the Kleibergen-Paap
F statistic, conrming that there are not problem on weak instruments.
The high negative e¤ect of average immigrants on per capita GDP may have two possible
explanations. A possible explanation relies on the fact that per capita GDP measure su¤ers of
an increase in the number of inactive immigrants. This is a well known feature in migration
literature: family reunion involves inactive foreign born individuals (such as children). A second
possible explanation is the assimilation problem. When a migrant arrives in his destination
country, he takes time before nding a job, so it strongly negatively a¤ects per capita GDP. To
solve for the inactive immigrants problem we replicate the same estimation as before by using
per hour worked GDP (this measure does not su¤er the inow of inactive population and it has
been often taken as a proxy for the countrys macroeconomic labour productivity measure).40
Figure 3.12 shows results when the dependent variable is per hour worked GDP, it is inter-
esting to notice that the coe¢ cients associated to immigration share are all lower than those in
gure 3.11 and not statistically di¤erent from zero, this conrms our intuition that per capita
GDP su¤ers of inactive immigrants (this results is in line with the widely accepted idea in
literature that immigrants have a small negative e¤ect on wages in host countries). But the
actual end of this paper is to understand if there is place for skill selective immigration policy,
and the positive and signicant coe¢ cient for the interacted variable conrms that being skilled
among immigrants has a positive e¤ect on the host countrys per hour worked GDP variation.
Observing that per hour worked GDP can be considered as a measure for macroeconomic labour
productivity, we may conclude that the inows of tertiary educated immigrants have a positive
e¤ect on labour productivity variation. Moreover, since 1 is not statistically di¤erent from
zero, we may say that the overall e¤ect of immigration on labour productivity variation is posi-





As a robustness check we replicated the same estimation in [3.1] for two other sub-samples of
data: (i) high income countries obtained by excluding the two poorest countries in the original
sample (Poland and Slovak Republic); (ii) low income countries obtained by excluding United
States and Canada. Results in gures 3.10-3.12. For these two others samples used, the e¤ect
of average immigration on per capita GDP variation is still negative and signicant, and the
e¤ect of the interacted variable (in other words the e¤ects of being tertiary educated among
immigrants) is again positive and signicant for both OLS and IV estimations. It is interesting
to notice that the negative e¤ect of average immigrants on per capita GDP variation for the
high income countries sample is higher that for low income countries sample (while coe¢ cient
on the interacted variable remains roughly unchanged), this may be due to the fact that the
inactive migrants problem in high income countries is stronger than in low income countries.41
As a further robustness check we replicate the same analysis by using the selection ratio
to interact the immigrants ows. The selection ratio is the number of skilled over unskilled
migrants, in our case it has been computed as the ratio between the stocks in 2000 of tertiary
educated immigrants over primary educated immigrants. This variable is a proxy for the human
capital structure of migration stock, but by interacting it with the ows of immigrants, we have
a proxy for the human capital structure of the immigrants ows. For all the three samples
used for the estimation, we obtain similar coe¢ cient to the case in which the share of skilled
immigrants was used to interact the immigrants ows. Figure 3.13 shows that an increase in
the human capital structure of immigrants ows toward tertiary educated immigrants (e.g. an
increase in the number of skilled versus the number of unskilled immigrants) would have a
positive e¤ect on per capita GDP (and on per hour worked GDP) variation, but again, the
negative e¤ect of average immigrants inows42 overcompensates this positive e¤ect. The same
results are obtained by using the two subsamples dened before (high and low income countries).
This conrms the theoretical results in Benhabib (1996) that the impact of immigration strongly
depends on the human capital structure of immigrants ows. Finally, this also gives a role to a
41A more rigorous test for this hypothesis should be conducted by using variable concerning countriesregu-
lation on family reunion policy.
42First stage regressions results for this new estimations are reported in gure 3.10 (b).
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skill selective immigration policy (aimed to increase the selection ratio) in a¤ecting positively
income in host countries.
3.4 Conclusions
The aim of the chapter was to investigate the e¤ect of immigrants ow and its human capital
content on host countrys income variation43. Negative e¤ect of immigrants arises under a neo-
classical production function where immigrants are considered as an increase in low productive
workers. But allowing for the possibility that migrants can bring along them some human
capital from their origin country, the human capital dilution given by the increased population
may be o¤set. Under this setting the e¤ect of immigration on host countries income depends
on the human capital content of immigrants. So in the chapter we estimated the e¤ects of
immigrants and their skill level on host countries income variation. We provide evidence of
the positive e¤ect of being skilled among immigrants on per capita GDP variation about its
mean by using instrumental variable panel data model (xed e¤ects for destination countries),
but the overall e¤ect of immigrants inows is still negative. In particular a 1% increase in
the variation of zero human capital endowed immigrants inows leads to a 1.1% decrease in
per capita GDP deviation from its time mean, while being high skilled among immigrants con-
tributes 0.45% positively on per capita GDP variation. Similarly, a 1% increase in the selection
ratio of immigrants ows variation leads to a 0.29% increase in per capita GDP variation (but
again it not enough to clear the negative e¤ect of the overall immigrants inows). So we may
certainly conclude in favour of a skill selective immigration policy aimed to increase the share of
skilled over unskilled immigrants. There are some possible reasons of why immigrants have a so
negative e¤ect on per capita GDP. Among them we decided to explore the problem of inactive
immigrants that reduce itself per capita GDP measure. We solved this problem by using per
hour worked GDP as dependent variable. By using the latter as a dependent variable we obtain
some interesting results: (i) unskilled immigrants have a null e¤ect on per hour worked GDP
variation (that can be alternatively interpreted as a macroeconomic labour productivity mea-
43 In doing this, we pointed to stress the relevance and the validity of our instrumental variables because it is
a crucial point in all the literature concerning immigration as independent variable.
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sure); while (ii) being skilled among immigrants has a positive e¤ect on per hour worked GDP
variation. So we may conclude that in the limit case that immigrants have zero human capital
content, their e¤ect on labour productivity variation is null (this is not true when the selection
ratio is used to interact the immigrants share); but allowing for some human capital content
of immigrants (which is the most realistic case) their e¤ect is positive on labour productivity
variation.
Some other possible theoretical reasons for the so negative e¤ect of immigrants on income
variation is that the human capital content of immigrants (from poor countries, as in our
estimation) is even lower than the human capital content of native workers in OECD countries
(this is the idea by Dolado, Goria and Ichino 1994). An other explanation is that physical
capital does not immediately adjust after immigrants inows (this is the explanation given in
literature for the negative e¤ect of immigration on national wages); so a further step would be to
consider inows of foreign capitals as a possible help in the adjustment of physical capital after
immigration inows. Intermediate results of the paper are: (i) having found further evidence of
the importance of geographic variables and bilateral aid as determinants of bilateral migration
ows, (ii) having tested our instrumental variables for their relevance and validity, allowing
them to be used in many other estimations involving immigration as independent variable.
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Figure 3-1: Share of immigrants (stock 2000) over total population, share of tertiary educated
over total stock of immigrants in 2000, share of tertiary educated natives workers over total






Australia 21.2 40.3 30.9
Austria 10.2 12.7 14.6
Belgium 8.9 19.8 28.5
Canada 15.1 58.8 49.6
Czech Republic 4.0 11.5 10.7
Denmark 4.3 17.3 21.8
Finland 1.7 23.8 26.3
France 6.1 16.4 22.4
Germany 5.7 21.8 25.8
Hungary 1.1 11.6 12.0
Ireland 7.4 41.1 16.3
Italy 1.6 15.4 8.5
Japan 0.8 28.1 23.8
Luxembourg 22.9 21.7 30.3
Netherlands 11.3 22.0 21.9
New Zealand 13.8 40.9 21.6
Norway 5.0 28.7 21.2
Poland 1.9 14.0 11.0
Portugal 1.4 18.6 8.6
Slovak Republic 0.7 15.2 11.5
Spain 3.9 18.5 11.8
Sweden 8.6 25.7 27.7
Switzerland 20.9 18.6 16.6
United Kingdom 6.0 34.9 16.1
United States 8.6 42.7 52.5
Source : author on F.Docquier, A.Marfouk and B.L.Lowell (2007)
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Figure 3-3: Relation between the share of skilled immigrants in 2000 and: (a) the share of
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Figure 3-5: List of the destination and origin countries












Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bolivia, Brazil,
Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic,
Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire,
Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El
Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea,
Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel,
Jamaica, Kenya, Korea, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Macedonia, Malaysia,
Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal,
Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines,
Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore,
Slovenia, Somalia, South Africa,Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syria,
Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam,
Zambia, Zimbabwe.
97
Figure 3-6: Results for bilateral migration ows estimation: 1998-2007 in 24 OECD countries
from 86 poor and developing countries
Dependent variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
0.37 0.289 0.216 0.288











Observations 4945 4935 4935 4935
Number of id_push 766 766 766 766
R-squared within 0.223 0.320 0.410
rho 0.27***
Bilateral immigrants flows in ln
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses







SE and statistics are robust to both arbitrary and intra-group heteroskedasticity
98
Figure 3-7: Results for bilateral skilled migration ows estimation: 1998-2007 in 24 OECD

















Observations 8447 8402 8402
Number of id_push 1099 1099 1099
R-squared within 0.36 0.66
rho 0.33***
D_common_language
Expenditure in tertiary edu (ln)
N°of patent (ln)
Bilateral skilled immigrants flows in ln
ln_skilled_immi_1991
D_contiguity
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
SE and statistics are robust to both arbitrary and intra-group heteroskedasticity
D_colonial_relationship
weighted distance
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
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Figure 3-8: Relation between the actual immigrants inows and the estimated inows of immi-
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Figure 3-9: Relation between the actual and estimated ows of both immigrants and tertiary
educated immigrants










Number of countries 24 24
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses
constant
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%






Figure 3-10: First stage regressions results






0.686 1.681 0.847 2.092 0.681 1.651
(2.94)*** (2.76)** (4.32)*** (3.84)*** (2.85)** (2.61)**
0.866 2.672 0.848 2.673 0.899 2.735
(4.48)*** (4.56)*** (3.93)*** (4.11)*** (4.30)*** (4.30)***
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-sq 0.443 0.423 0.451 0.429 0.444 0.419
F test exclu. Ins. 16.96 19.93 23.77 30.83 15.88 18.04
Kleibergen-Paap F
Observations 214 214 199 199 196 196
Number of countries 24 24 22 22 22 22






0.686 2.166 0.847 2.727 0.681 2.127
(2.94)*** (2.73)** (4.32)*** (4.25)*** (2.85)** (2.59)**
0.866 3.567 0.848 3.616 0.899 3.661
(4.48)*** (4.27)*** (3.93)*** (3.91)** (4.30)*** (4.04)***
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-sq 0.443 0.409 0.451 0.42 0.444 0.406
F-stat 16.96 15.98 23.77 28.17 15.88 14.52
Kleibergen-Paap F
Observations 214 214 199 199 196 196





SE and statistics are robust to both arbitrary and intra-group heteroskedasticity
immi fit share in ln
Complete Sample
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
skilled immi fit share in ln
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Low Income CountriesComplete Sample
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
SE and statistics are robust to both arbitrary and intra-group heteroskedasticity
Low Income CountriesHigh Income Countries
immi fit share in ln
(b)
skilled immi fit share in ln
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Figure 3-11: Per capita GDP as dependent variable: 2SLS results
Dependent: per capita GDP OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
-0.132 -1.107 -0.189 -1.236 -0.123 -1.075
(1.86)* (-1.78)* (2.88)*** (-1.94)** (1.63) (-1.65)*
0.087 0.449 0.101 0.495 0.083 0.451
(3.48)*** (2.17)** (4.45)*** (2.33)** (3.12)*** (1.99)**
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-stat 79.89 13.08 72.22 10.46 72.89 11.23
DWH test
Observations 238 214 218 199 218 196
Number of countries 24 24 22 22 22 22




Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
8.52 8.36 7.15
Low Income CountriesComplete Sample High Income Countries
Figure 3-12: Per hour worked GDP as dependent variable: 2SLS results
Dependent: per Hour GDP OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
-0.017 -0.919 -0.09 -0.955 0.004 -0.953
(-0.26) (-1.50) (-1.44) (-1.54) (0.05) (-1.43)
0.042 0.388 0.061 0.394 0.034 0.403
(1.74)* (1.84)* (2.82)** (1.89)* (1.31) (1.73)*
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-stat 63.99 10.41 52.95 9.09 58.26 8.68
DWH test
Observations 238 214 218 199 218 196
Number of countries 24 24 22 22 22 22




SE and statistics are robust to both arbitrary and intra-group heteroskedasticity
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses
Complete Sample High Income Countries Low Income Countries
ln_immi_share
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Figure 3-13: Second stage regression results when the selection ratio has been used to interact
the immigrants ows
Dependent: per capita GDP OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
-0.085 -0.916 -0.178 -1.055 -0.076 -0.899
(1.53) (2.19)** (3.35)*** (2.66)*** (1.33) (-1.99)**
0.053 0.297 0.073 0.323 0.051 0.294
(3.61)*** (2.53)** (5.31)*** (2.92)*** (3.30)*** (2.29)**
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-stat 80.67 8.47 78.9 6.86 73.87 7.55
DWH test
Observations 238 214 218 199 218 196
Number of countries 24 24 22 22 22 22
Dependent: per Hour GDP OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
0.016 -0.778 -0.092 -0.811 0.029 -0.796
(0.31) (-1.90)* (1.80)* (2.03)** (0.52) (-1.79)*
0.022 0.257 0.046 0.257 0.018 0.263
(1.58)*** (2.20)** (3.51)*** (2.33)** (1.27) (2.05)**
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-stat 63.58 8.04 56.17 7.01 58.19 6.91
DWH test
Observations 238 214 208 199 218 196
Number of countries 24 24 21 22 22 22
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
4.62 4.88 3.97
Complete Sample High Income Countries Low Income Countries
SE and statistics are robust to both arbitrary and intra-group heteroskedasticity








High Income Countries Low Income CountriesComplete Sample
(b)
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
5.09 5.29 4.32
SE and statistics are robust to both arbitrary and intra-group heteroskedasticity
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Chapter 4
O¤shoring, migrants and native
workers: the optimal choice under
asymmetric information
4.1 Introduction
When a migrant arrives in his host country, he brings along a lot of things with him but he
cannot transfer his homelands information structure. Therefore the host country employers
are not well informed about immigrant workers, their ability and e¤ort. This is the reason
why we decide to model migration under asymmetric information. Some works focus on the
role of asymmetric information in determining the skill composition of migrants (Katz and
Stark 1987), others study the role of information asymmetries on the decision to migrate.
Recent papers on the optimal international organization of rms when both, o¤shoring and
hiring immigrant workers are feasible options (Ottaviano, Peri and Wright 2010), consider
perfect information about immigrants. But, since asymmetric information modies the wage
schedule for immigrants, asymmetric information can change the traditional trade-o¤ between
o¤shoring and hiring immigrant workers. Moreover because of imperfect monitoring (on both
natives and immigrants) workers may not deliver on their promises about e¤ort, so incentives
must be provided to workers for their e¤ort. This paper will not analyze the nature of the
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relation between native and immigrant workers (complementarity or substitutability1). We
start from a stylised fact: recent immigration ows into rich countries allow local employers
to hire immigrants, this strategy potentially substitutes for the more traditional o¤shoring of
production. Under asymmetric information about immigrants, employers dont observe the
ability and the e¤ort level by immigrants. Thus, foreign born workers will be paid the average
of the overall immigrant workers output. The main result of the analysis is that it will be
optimal to o¤shore the production when the rm decides to produce low quality goods, while
it will be optimal to produce high quality goods at home using native workers. If the rm
decides to produce intermediate quality level goods, it will be optimal to produce at home
using immigrant workers.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Paragraph 4.2 presents a review of exist-
ing literature. Paragraph 4.3 presents the baseline model; results are presented in paragraph
4.4. Paragraph 4.5 extends the baseline model to a continuum of types of workers. The nal
paragraph concludes.
4.2 Review of the literature
This paper relies on two main streams of literature: (i) one concerning the relation between
migration and o¤shoring, (ii) the other concerning the role of asymmetric information in the
economics of migration. Although traditional Heckscher-Ohlin models predict substitutability
between immigration and o¤shoring2, a consensus has not been reached in giving a sign to the
relation between immigration and o¤shoring. The question was rst analyzed by Ramaswami
(1968), who argued that a capital abundant country can either o¤shore parts of the production
abroad (enjoying higher return on capital and lower wages) or invite foreign workers paying
them a lower wage than natives. Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1983) doubted the possibility of
hiring foreign born workers at a lower wage than natives, but recent empirical studies show that
immigrants earn less than natives (Antecol, Cobb-Clark and Trejo 2003; Butcher and Di Nardo
2002; Chiswick, Le and Miller 2008) giving new lymph to this debate. Recent theoretical works
1See Ottaviano and Peri (2008), Peri and Sparber (2009), Borjas (2003), Borjas, Grogger and Hanson (2008).
2 Immigrants increase the labor endowment in receiving countries, in the short run it reduces the capital labor
ratio and thus it increases the return on capital. The increased return on capital deters o¤shoring.
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by Jones (2005) and Ottaviano, Peri and Wright (2010) shed light on the relation between
o¤shoring and immigration. The main conclusion in Ottaviano, Peri and Wright (2010) is that
easy production tasks are o¤shored, intermediate tasks are covered by immigrants in the home
country, while complicated tasks are covered by native workers at home.
Empirically, Javorcik et.al. (2006) nd a positive relation between immigrants in the U.S.
and the outward FDI by American rms, this kind of complementarity becomes stronger if
we consider skilled immigrants (El Yaman, Kugler and Rapoport 2007). Indeed an increase
in the number of immigrants increases the information about their country of origin reducing
the cost of o¤shoring. On the contrary Barba Navaretti, Bertola and Sembenelli (2008) nd
substitutability between immigration and o¤shoring. Finally Ottaviano, Peri and Wright (2010)
nd empirical evidence of complementarity between o¤shoring and migration, because only easy
tasks are o¤shored, while as tasks become more complex they are covered by immigrants, and
nally the tasks at the upper end of complexity are assigned to natives.
This literature considers the characteristics of immigrants and their abilities perfectly known
to employers in host countrys rms. In our view, however, employers in host countries are not
perfectly informed about the ability of new immigrants, due to their inability to assess the
education level, the experience, and other dimensions related to cultural di¤erences. This may
potentially change the relation between migration and o¤shoring in theoretical models.
The basic idea underlying all works in the eld of migration under asymmetric information is
that when information on the ability of immigrants in unknown to receiving countrys employer,
all migrants will receive the same wage, based on the average product of the group of migrants.
The seminal work in this eld was by Katz and Stark (1984); they observed that employers in
the immigrants receiving country have less information than employers in the country of origin
as to the type of worker in terms of productivity and e¤ort. The reason is that when a worker
migrates, he cannot take his home country information structure. Katz and Stark (1987, 1989)
argue that under asymmetric information (and without the possibility to invest in devices to
identify migrants skill level) the individual wage o¤ered to immigrant workers is equal to the
average product of the immigrant workers group.
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4.3 The baseline model
Under symmetric information each worker receives a wage equal to his productivity; but under
asymmetric information on foreign born workers and assuming immigrants do not engage in
any "signaling" about their skill level, employers will pay an average (on the base of the skill
composition of the labour force) wage to all migrant workers in production (Katz and Stark
1987). Thus a kind of discrimination in wages may arise between home and foreign born
workers due to asymmetric information on immigrants ability3. Hence each rm can carry
out two strategies (alternative to using native workers) to reduce costs: (i) stay at home and
hire immigrants, (ii) localize a production plant abroad in order to enjoy a lower labour cost
(o¤shoring).
The supply side of the economy is here described by a simplied Kremer (1993) production
function4, where the manufacture of a unit of nal goods requires only labour and a number
of tasks (at the end of each task the employer checks the quality of the intermediate output).
Lets assume two tasks: a "communication intensive" task, unfeasible for foreign born workers
because of lack in language skills, and a "manual intensive" task which in principle can be
carried out by both native and foreign born workers5. The manual task requires n workers and
the quality of the nal output depends on the quality of the manual task.
Lets assume two countries, a rich country (R) and a poor country (P); two types of workers
may be used in the manual task: the high skilled one H and the low skilled one L; where i
is the skill type of workers. Each worker may choose his e¤ort level ej = 1; 2 in production. We
also assume that every type of worker is represented in the pool of hired workers6, but:
 the e¤ort by immigrant and native workers in production (ej) is private information
 the employer is not able to distinguish between types (i) of foreign workers in production
3We assume symmetric information about native workers.
4The Kremer (1993) production function has the following form:
E(y) = k (ni=1qi)nB
where E(y) is the expected output level, n is the number of tasks in production, B is the output per worker
with a single unit of capital k, and q is the workers skill (or quality) as the expected percentage of maximum
value the product retains if the workers performs the task.
5The distinction between "comunicative" and "manual" tasks has been made by Peri and Sparber (2009).
6Results dont change if we relax this assumption.
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 the employer is able to distinguish between types (i) of home born workers in production
To keep things simple lets assume only two workers in manual task (this assumption will
be relaxed subsequentely) so the overall quality level depends on the workers skills in manual
task production and on their e¤ort level. Let q denote quality of the product, four quality levels
can be produced:
[4.1] qi =
qo = He0 + Le0
q1 = He0 + Le1
q2 = He1 + Le0
q3 = He1 + Le1
The quality level can be thought of as a joint probability of having more or less skilled
workers in production exerting low or high e¤ort in production. Assuming that, e¤ort being
equal, the productivity in terms of quality is higher for the high-skilled workers than for the
low-skilled workers (H > L) we may conclude:
[4.2] q0 < q1 < q2 < q3:
We assume that the rm has all the bargaining power in contracting, it makes a take-it
or leave-it o¤er to the worker; the worker can accept or reject the contract. If he rejects the
contract he receives a wage (wu) provided by the government or alternatively by other rms
in other sectors. The price of a unit of output is assumed to be increasing with the quality
level and the wage for a comunication intensive task can be omitted because it does not make
a di¤erence among the three alternatives (producing at home using natives or immigrants, or
producing abroad). Each rm at home will maximize a unit prot function, namely revenue
less costs in the following form:
[4.3] (qi) = p(qi)  2w(qi)7
Similarly each worker maximizes utility as a function of wage and e¤ort cost (e):
[4.4] u = w(qi)  e
7Where only labor is assumed in production.
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each worker of type i will choose the e¤ort that maximizes his utility. In order for qi
to be attainable, wage schedules have to satisfy the following participation (IR) and incentive
constraints (IC):
[4.5] (IR) w(qi)  ej = wu 8qi
[4.6] (IC) w(qi)  ej = w(q i )  ek 6=j 8qi
where i stands for the quality level of the output, j stands for the e¤ort level (1 or 2)
required by worker H or L, as it applies, in order to achieve qi; q i is a quality level lower than
qi if the worker who receives the incentive produces a low e¤ort, as a consequence w(q i ) is
the "punishing" wage provided by the employer if the actual quality level is lower than the
expected one (see appendix for more details). Notice that the (IR) in [4.5] has to be binding,
otherwise the employer could reduce the wage still satisfying the participation constraint. The
(IC) constraint here assures that the worker who gets the incentive will exert a high e¤ort level.
Indeed, ex-ante the employer decides for how many workers he wants high e¤ort (according
to the quality level he wants to reach), so according to (IC) and (IR) the employer denes a
contract (take it or leave it) for workers. If the employer decides to provide incentives to the
workers, because of hidden actions, they may receive the incentive and shirk. This opportunistic
behaviour is avoided by IC constraint (see appendix for details).
Lets start looking at what happens under perfect information about native worker types.
If the employer knows the type of workers in manual task (but he still does not observe their
e¤ort level), he may set ad hoc wages and incentives according to each quality level, thus the
following prot functions derive (e¤ort is not observable):
[4.7] (q0) = p(q0)  2wh;nr
[4.8] (q1) = p(q1)  2wh;nr  
[4.9] (q2) = p(q2)  2wh;nr  
[4.10] (q3) = p(q1)  2wh;nr   2
where wh;nr = w
h;n
u + e0 is the reservation wage at home for native workers and  = e1  e0.
Thus functions in [4.7] - [4.10] may be thought of as prots functions for every attainable quality
level when natives are employed in production (because there is perfect information about the
ability of natives).
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But, if the rm hires immigrants, it cannot distinguish the type of immigrants in production
and their e¤ort level (asymmetric information) even if each individual knows his type and e¤ort.
Under asymmetric information about immigrants, each rm will pay immigrants a uniform wage
as a function of the quality level that the rm wants to reach (see Kats and Stark 1984, 1987).
If the rm wants to produce q0 there is no reason for providing incentives and only participation
constraints have to be satised:
[4.11] wh;m(q0) = w
h;m
u + e0 = w
h;m
r
so when the employer wants to reach the lower quality level, he has to pay both workers the
reservation wage. If the rm wants to produce a higher quality level, a high e¤ort by the low
productive worker is needed, so the rm has to provide incentive to him. From the incentive
compatibility constraint we derive the wage:
[4.12] wh;m(q1) = w
h;m
r + (e1   e0) = wh;mr +:
But because of asymmetric information about the type of the two immigrant workers in
production (the employer is not able to distinguish among them in setting ad hoc contracts),
the rm will pay an equal wage to both workers in production. This implies that in order to
obtain a quality level higher than q0 the rm has to pay the incentive to both workers. So that
intermediate quality levels cost as much as the highest quality level (q3), so they are dominated.
Thus, if the rm wants to reach the higher quality level (q3) it has to induce high e¤ort by both
workers paying them the following wage:
[4.13] wh;m(q3) = w
h;m
r + (e1   e0) = wh;mr +:
So the rm can realize a higher quality level q3 by spending the same wage cost as for q1 or
q2: If the rm keeps production at home hiring immigrants in the manual task (enjoying the
lower reservation wage by immigrants, as we will see in what follows) just two output strategies
are not dominated: q0 and q3: Assuming p(qi) = qi the prot functions associated to these
strategies are:
[4.14] h;m(q0) = q0   2w(q0) = e0H + e0L   2wh;mr
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[4.15] h;m(q3) = q3   2w(q3) = e1H + e1L   2wh;mr   2
If the rm chooses to produce abroad, it has to pay a local agent8 (costing ) who reveals
both the type of local workers and how to produce quality level higher than the minimum one
abroad. This allows the rm to pay a customized wage. If the rm wants to produce q0 abroad,
it has to guarantee the participation contraint (as at home). The wage schedule and prot
function will be9:
[4.16] wf (q0) = w
f
u + eo = w
f
r
[4.17] f (q0) = q0   2w(q0) = e0H + e0L   2wfr
When the rm wants to reach a higher quality level, it has to provide an incentive to
the low type to obtain q1 or to the high type to obtain q2: But as in the domestic case, the
incentive provided to the high productive worker is the same as the incentive provided to the
low productive worker, so that the strategy q2 dominates the strategy q1: Quality q1 remains
dominated as it is at home but the quality q2 does not. Thus the wage schedule paid to the
high productive worker for an intermediate output level (q2) and the correspondent unit prot
functions are:
[4.18] wf (q2) = w
f
r +
[4.19] f (q2) = q2   2wfr     = e1H + e0L   2wfr    
Finally, if the rm wants to reach the highest quality level (q3) it has to provide incentive
to both workers ending up with the following prot function:
[4.20] f (q3) = q2   2wfr   2   = e1H + e1L   2wfr   2  :
The following table summarizes the unit prot functions for each quality-strategy combina-
tion10:
8The cost of information here is assumed as xed (we will remove this assumption in paragraph 4.5) and it
must be paid if the rm o¤shore the production abroad. This is why it would be too expensive for the employer
to buy information about immigrants at home, indeed it would imply to pay an agent for each origin country by
immigrants in production.
9Notice that because just a low e¤ort level is requested by the rm, there is no reason to pay for the local
agent to reveal the workers e¤ort.
10Remember that quality level q1 is dominated for all the strategies.
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Natives Immigrants O¤shoring
q0 e0H + e0L   2wh;nr e0H + e0L   2wh;mr e0H + e0L   2wfr
q2 e1H + e0L   2wh;nr   e1H + e0L   2wh;mr   2 e1H + e0L   2wfr    
q3 e1H + e1L   2wh;nr   2 e1H + e1L   2wh;mr   2 e1H + e1L   2wfr   2  
4.4 The baseline model results
Under symmetric information the employer knows the ability of workers at home (and abroad)
and he also knows how to produce abroad, so that there is no need to pay a local agent abroad.
Assuming that the reservation wage for workers at home is higher than workers abroad (this is
plausible if the home country is richer and gives a higher unemployment subsidy than the poor
country) producing abroad is always better than producing at home (remark that we assume
no xed cost for o¤shore the production abroad).




11 with wh;nr   wh;mr > 12 ; the model in its simplest version gives to the rm an
instrument to decide its optimal localization strategy given the level of quality it would produce.
If a rm wants to produce q0 it will be optimal for the rm to produce abroad, because there
is no reason for paying the local agent and the reservation wage is lower than at home.
If a rm wants to produce an intermediate quality level (q2), it has to compare prots for q2
at home using either native or immigrant workers with prots obtained producing abroad. The
strategy of using natives is dominated by immigrants, and then it will be optimal to produce





Finally, when a rm wants to produce the maximum quality level, the strategy of producing





> =2: Since the conditions under which it is optimal to produce abroad
become more restrictive with the increasing quality level13, we conclude that:
11Reservation wage for immigrants is lower than for natives because wu for immigrants is lower than for natives.
This is clear if we imagine immigrant as a guest worker (the case of Turkish migration to Germany) who works,
consumes and saves during his working age and consumes savings during the retired age enjoing the PPP in his
origin country
12This means that home born workers have a reservation wage higher than the wage given to an immigrant







Proposition 1 the higher the quality level required, the larger the range of circumstances under
which the rm decides to keep production at home14.
In this model the role of the local agents cost is crucial because it represents the cost of
information. So now we go deeper in the role of  in choosing the rms optimal strategy.
Up to this point we found that: (i) there is no place for a native workforce (except for the
comunication intensive task), (ii) the quality level q1 is dominated for all the strategies by the
highest quality level (q3), (iii) it is always optimal to produce the minimum quality level abroad.
So we can restrict the analysis to the quality levels q2 and q3 comparing o¤shoring and hiring
immigrants: When the rm wants to produce q2 the prot di¤erential between the immigrant
and o¤shoring strategy can be written as follows:









< 2 2 the rm nds optimal producing at home, conversely when
wh;mr   wfr

> 2   2 the rm nds optimal producing abroad. Similarly when the output
quality level is q3 the prots di¤erence will be:














> 2 : Notice that the migrantsproductivity levels do not matter because
they clear out in the prot di¤erence h;m(q)  f (q). So, given a certain di¤erence in reservation
wage between home and foreign country, the prots di¤erence depends upon the cost of the
local agent. The resulting situation can be represented by the graph in gure 4.1, where the
dashed line represents the case in which the rm is indi¤erent producing q3 at home or abroad,
while the continuous line has the same meaning but in the case of q2. The area under the line
represents the circumstances for which it is optimal to produce at home using immigrants. It
is easy to observe that an increase in the cost of the local agent makes producing at home more
14 If the rm had the possibility to know the type of immigrants workers (symmetric information) and if pro-
ducing abroad had a xed cost (#), under the assumption that whr > w
f





> #=2 for each quality level. So we can conclude that asymmetric information introduces
new threshold for the intermediate quality level q2 making it less likely to be produced at home.
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Figure 4-1: Relation between the wage di¤erential and the cost of the local agent to have




and more protable. Comparing the areas under the two curves we can conclude that the higher
the quality level, the greater the circumstances under which rm decides to keep production at
home.
4.4.1 Lower productivity abroad
Up to now we assumed a worker exerting a certain e¤ort level produces a quality level that
is equal both at home and abroad. This may be a restrictive assumption if we imagine very
di¤erent countries in our model. The organization of labour and the technological level may
di¤er between countries, in particular between poor and rich ones. In order to take into account
this issue, we simply assume that the e¤ort level abroad produces a lower quality level than
at home, in other words we assume that ~efi = kei (where 0 < k < 1). Since the disutility by
e¤ort is not a¤ected, the IC and the IR constraints remain unchanged. The parameter k can
be seen as the similarity between home and foreign country in terms of organization of labour
and technological level.
This assumption does not change the prot functions for the home strategy, but it changes
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prot function in [4.17], [4.19] and [4.20] for the production abroad15:
[4.23] f (q0) = H~e0 + L~e0   2wfr = k(He0 + Le0)  2wfr
[4.24] f (q2) = H~e1 + L~e0   2wfr     = k(He1 + Le0)  2wfr    
[4.25]f (q3) = H~e1 + L~e1   2wfr   2   = k(He1 + Le1)  2wfr   2  
Given these new prots functions, as in the former section, the strategy of using natives
at home is still dominated, so we will consider the two other strategies in the rest of the
paragraph. It would be optimal to produce quality q0 at home using immigrants if (w
h;m
r  wfr ) <
1
2 [(1 k)(He0+Le0)]; so when k is close to one (i.e. e¤ort in foreign country produces a quality
level similar to that at home) it is optimal to o¤shore the production; while if the foreign country
has an organization of labour and/or a technological level such that e¤ort produces a lower
quality level than at home (so k decreases), the strategy of staying at home using immigrants is
allowed to be optimal for the rm16. If the rm wants to reach the quality level q2 it would be
optimal to produce at home using immigrants if (whr  wfr ) < 12 [(1  k)(He1 + Le0) + ].
Again the lower the k parameter the lower the probability that the rm nds it optimal to
o¤shore the production abroad.
Finally if the rm wants to reach the highest quality level q3 it would be optimal to produce
it at home if (whr  wfr ) < 12 [(1  k)(He1 + Le1) + ]. Notice that with respect to the simple
case in which e¤ort produces the same quality level in both countries, here the conditions
of optimality for every quality level for the home strategy are increased by a positive term
(12(1 k)(He1+Le0)), that increases the circumstances under which it is optimal to produce
at home using immigrants17. Intuitively, wide technological di¤erences between home and
foreign countries discourage the home employer to delocalize the production abroad.
15Remember that q1 is dominated both at home and abroad.
16This conclusion was not possible under the assumption that the two countries have the same technology and
the same organization of labor.
17Moreover, even if the rm producing abroad would be free to save the local agent cost () and behaving
under asymmetric information, there is still place for the strategy of using immigrants at home. In particular
the conditions under which it is optimal to produce abroad (without paying the local agent) are:
[a] (wh;mr   wfr ) < 12 [(1  k)(He1 + Le0)] for quality level q2
[b] (wh;mr   wfr ) < 12 [(1  k)(He1 + Le1)] for quality level q3
116
4.5 Many workers with a continuum of types
The results so far rely on the assumption of only two workers, one for each type, in production.
Now we relax this assumption allowing for many workers (n = 0; ::; N) in a continuum of skill
levels. Each worker still provides a certain level of e¤or (ej = 1; 2). The distribution of workers





support  2 [m;1]19, and where m is the lowest type of the distribution. The distribution
of skills in the rm reects the overall distribution of skill in the country.
The employer chooses the quality level he wants to reach (q) and consequently the scheme
of incentives to give to workers (in other words he denes j as the last type of worker receiving
the incentive); so the rm will provide incentive to workers type from m to j and the higher
j the higher the quality of the output. The quality level of the output is now a continuous
variable dened as follows:







Before going into dening the prots functions, we need to set up the new participation and
incentive constraints. The (IC) constraints will assure us that each worker who receives the
incentive will exert a high e¤ort, while the (IR) constraint reects the fact that agent of type
 has the option of rejecting the contract and having wu but he prefers to take the contract,
and this has to be valid for each type  2 [m;1]:
[4.27] (IR) w(q(j ; e))  ej  wu 8 2 [m;1]
[4.28] (IC) w(q(j ; e))  ej  w(q (j ; e))  ek 6=j 8  j 2 [m;1]
The IR constraint has to be binding because otherwise the employer may reduce the wage
and increase prots without losing the worker. The IC constraint assures that the incentive
18The Pareto distribution is quite convenient to our purpose because it has a support positively dened (it
would not be intuitive to have negative productivity types) and because it allows us to have a high share of
low productive workers and a low share of high productive workers and it ts well the real world. Moreover by
changing the  parameter between home and abroad, and assuming hom e < abroad we can replicate the actual
situation in which a poor country (abroad) has an higher share of low productive workers than a rich country
(home).
19Results dont change allowing for a truncated support (i.e  2 [m; 1]); it simply implies to divide the density
function by the term 1  m
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scheme is respected by workers, in other words, the utility by each worker if he respects the
incentive scheme (w(q(j ; e))  ej) is greater than the utility in the case of shirking behaviour
(w(q (; e)) ek 6=j). The problem here is that for a huge number of workers in production, the
shirking behaviour of a single worker has no e¤ect on the overall quality, so it can be the case
that shirking behaviour cannot be detected and punished by the employer by giving w(q (; e)).
Thus our model only works perfectly in cases of a small number of workers. Using the model in
the case of large rms (great number of workers) requires the additional assumption that each
worker that receives the incentive will exert the high e¤ort for sure20. In order to make the
model more realistic we assume a training cost T (j)21 for immigrants (if used in production)
increasing with the quality level and so essentially increasing in j (i.e. this is the cost for
language skills); moreover we assume the cost of information  increases with the quality level
((j))22.
Under this set up the unit prot function when the rm keeps production at home using
natives (perfect information) and immigrants (asymmetric information) are respectively:























if the rm decides to o¤shore the production abroad, it will pay a local agent to reveal
workers type, so the rm will pay ad hoc wages and the unit prot function has the following
form:













20Alternatively we may think a large rm that splits the production in many stages, in which a small number
of employees work.
21The training cost function T (j) is assumed to be monotonically increasing and concave in j (i.e. _T (j) > 0
and T (j) < 0), and T (m) = 0
22The cost of information (j) is assumed to be monotonically increasing and concave in j (i.e. _(j) > 0




f()d is simply the share of workers that receive the incentive.
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Notice that the prot function in the case of production with immigrants workers includes
the cost of incentives, this is because we are considering the case in which the rm wants to
realize a quality level higher that the minimum. If the rm would produce the minimum level
of quality, it does not need to provide incentives, there is no reason for paying the local agent,
and no reason for meet the cost of training. Thus we may conclude again that, if the rm wants
to produce the lowest quality level, it would be optimal to produce abroad.
Since once j is xed (quality is xed) the revenue side of equations [4.29]-[4.31] does not
make a di¤erence between the alternative strategies, we can analyse the cost side (ci) in order
to conclude about the optimal choice for the rm:


































thus the cost functions in [4.32] - [4.34] can be written as:







[4.37] ch;mi = (w
h;m
r +)n+ T (j)








Figure 4.2 shows the cost functions in [4.36] - [4.38] that are monotonically increasing (and
concave) in j (i.e in the quality level). As in paragraph 4.4 we assume that:
[4.39] wh;nr   wh;mr > .
It assures that ch;n( = m) > ch;m( = m) > cf ( = m) thus for low quality output













so that as j increases (i.e and the quality level increases), the di¢ culty (cost) of producing
abroad rises faster than producing using both natives and immigrants; moreover the di¢ culty
in producing using immigrants rises faster than producing using natives. The assumptions
[4.39]-[4.40] guarantee that cf ( = 1) > ch;m( = 1) > ch;n( = 1) thus for high quality
output level, it is optimal to produce at home using native workers. Given assumptions [4.39]-
[4.40] only two scenarios may emerge, the case in which the strategy of using immigrants at
home is not dominated (gure 4.2(a)) or the case in which it is dominated (gure 4.2(b)); it




r ) and on the speed at which cost functions
in [4.36]-[4.38] increase with j :
When the strategy of using immigrants is not dominated (gure 4.2(a)) it will be optimal to
produce low quality goods (from quality m to OM ) abroad, to produce intermediate quality
goods (from quality OM to MI) at home using immigrants and high quality goods (from
quality MI to 1) at home using natives.
Scenario in gure 4.2(b) represents the case in which the strategy of using immigrants is
dominated; it occurs (for example) when the reservation wage for immigrants at home and na-
tives are very similar24, so also intuitively there is no place for the strategy of using immigrants
being optimal: when immigrants at home and natives have similar reservation wage, the em-
ployer has not convenience of paying the training cost for immigrants, and natives will be used
also for intermediate quality levels of output. Empirical results in Ottaviano, Peri and Wright
(2010) suggest that there are some tasks covered by natives, others covered by immigrants and
others o¤shored; so it seems that there is place for immigrants in domestic production. For this
reason we focus on the case in which immigrants-using-strategy is not dominated. Finally we
can conclude that the extension of the baseline model to a continuum of types doesnt change
the main conclusion:
Proposition 2 under asymmetric information about immigrants, the higher the quality level of
the output that the rm wants to reach, the greater the range of circumstances under which it is
24The same thing happens if the reservation wage abroad is very low with respect the reservation wage of
immigrants at home. Alternatively the strategy of using immigrants is dominated if the cost function of the
strategy of using immigrants at home is very steep.
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optimal for the rm to continue producing at home. In particular, for intermediate quality level
of output, the rm may prefer to produce at home by using immigrant workers in production.
4.5.1 Implications for the brain drain process
The span of quality levels (described by m - OM in gure 4.2) for which it is optimal to
o¤shore the production, depends also on the f parameter of the Pareto distribution of skills
abroad: the higher f is the lower the availability of skilled workers is in the poor country. Since
the brain drain process implies a reduction in the availability of high skilled workers in the poor
country, we can conclude that (everything else being constant) brain drain, by increasing f ,
reduces the stretch of quality for which it is optimal to produce abroad (gure 4.3). From
equation [4.38] we know that an increase in f , due to the brain drain process, makes the cost
function of producing abroad steeper in the early quality levels25 (from dashed to continuous
line of o¤shoring cost function in gure 4.3). This reduces the circumstances for which it is
optimal to produce abroad (from m - OM to m - 0OM in gure 4.3), and increases the cases
for which it would be optimal to produce at home by using foreign born workers.
So the brain drain process, reducing the number of high skilled workers in poor countries,
reduces also the span of quality levels that it is worthwhile to produce abroad, stimulating
domestic rms to produce at home using immigrants workers.
4.6 Conclusion
The increasing globalization and international factor movement are making more and more easy
both to o¤shore the production in countries where labour cost is low, and to hire immigrants
maintaining the plant in the home country. To our knowledge only two recent contributions
tried to develop a model combining o¤shoring and migrants hiring (Ottaviano, Peri and Wright
2010; Barba Navaretti, Bertola and Sembenelli 2008). The model we present in this paper
contributes to the literature considering the fact that employers dont have perfect information
25When j approaches to innity the cost of producing abroad does not depend of the f parameter
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Figure 4-3: Change in the cost function of producing abroad after the brain drain process out















about the ability of immigrants when they are used in production. Coherently with Ottaviano,
Peri and Wright (2010) we nd a kind of substitutability between the three alternatives that
rms may take (o¤shoring, immigrants or natives in home production). From the baseline
model, where only two skill levels are assumed in production, we conclude that the higher
the quality level that the rm wants to reach, the larger the circumstances under which it is
optimal for the rm to continue producing at home. Allowing for a continuum of worker types
in production, we nd that for low quality goods it would be optimal for a rm to o¤shore the
production abroad. For high quality level it will be optimal to produce at home using native
workers; but it may be the case that for intermediate quality levels, hiring foreign born workers
at home is the best choice. Finally we nd that brain drain process, by reducing the number
of high skilled workers in the poor country, shrinks the span of quality levels for which it is
optimal to produce abroad, increasing the cases for which it would be optimal to produce at
home using immigrants workers.
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4.7.1 A1: Why the incentive compatibility constraint avoids opportunistic
behaviour
Before starting the production, the employer decides how many workers to incentivate according
to the desired quality level, so he sets a contract (in the form of take it or leave it) to the workers.
At the end of the period the employer pays workers according to the observed quality level,
in particular he will pay w(qi) if the observed quality level is equal to the planned one (i.e no
shirking behaviour), otherwise he will pay a punishing wage w(q i ) if one of the two workers
does not exert e¤ort, or w(q   i ) if both workers avoid the e¤ort. This is credible because the
employer observes the quality level at the end of the period and he can recognize how one or
both workers behaved. This may be represented with the Prisoners Dilemma game as follows:
high effort low effort
high effort w(qi)  e1;w(qi)  e1 w(q i )  e1;w(q i )  e0
low effort w(q i )  e0;w(q i )  e1 w(q   i )  e0;w(q   i )  e0
given the payo¤ scheme each worker will not engage an opportunistic behaviour if w(qi) 
e1  w(q i ) e0  w(q   i ) e0 which is our incentive compatibility constraint. From the payo¤
scheme it is easy to derive the incentive as  = e1   e0:
4.7.2 A2: Extension: employer does not know the realization of workers
type in production
In paragraph 4.3 we assumed that employer knows the realization of workerstypes distribution
(we assumed always both one skilled and one unskilled worker in production). This may appear
restrictive, but removing this assumption does not change the conclusion of the model. If the
employer does not know the realization of types in production, he has an expected skill level in
production 26. So the quality levels in production change as follows (we use ~q to distinguish
with respect quality levels under perfect information about the realization of types) :






~q1 = e1 + He0
~q2 = e1 + Le0
~q3 = 2e1
With the new quality levels, we may derive the new prots functions when rm decides to
stay producing at home using immigrants27:
[4.51] h;m(~q0) = 2e0   2wh;mr
[4.52] h;m(~q1) = e1 + He0   2wh;mr   2
[4.53] h;m(~q2) = e1 + Le0   2wh;mr   2
[4.54] h;m(~q3) = 2e1   2wh;mr   2
again the solutions ~q1 and ~q2 are dominated by ~q3: At the same way we derive the prots
functions when the rms delocalizes the production abroad:
[4.55] f (~q0) = 2e0   2wfr
[4.56] f (~q1) = e1 + He0   2wfr    
[4.57] f (~q2) = e1 + Le0   2wfr    
[4.58] f (~q3) = 2e1   2wfr   2
Comparing the strategy to go abroad with the strategy to stay at home on the base of
the former prots functions, we may conclude that it will be optimal to produce the highest




< =2; it will be optimal to produce ~q2 at home if
whr   wfr

< ( ) =2; nally it will be never optimal to produce ~q0 at home28. In the end
we obtain the same results as in section 4.4 where employer knows the realization of types in
production.
27As in paragraphs 4.3 and 4.4 using native workers in the two workers model is dominated by immigrants
using choice.
28Remember that the strategy ~q1 is dominated both at home and abroad strategy.
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